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5Foreword 
Illicit trade on darknet markets is one manifestation of the increasingly complex nature of 
transnational organised crime in the European Union (EU). Darknet markets, also known as 
cryptomarkets, provide a largely anonymous platform for trading in illicit goods and services. 
Drugs are estimated to account for around two thirds of darknet market activity. Almost any 
type of drug is accessible to buyers with basic technical understanding within a few clicks, 
including new psychoactive substances. This development poses a significant threat to the 
health and security of citizens and communities across the EU.
This report summarises our current understanding of the functioning of darknet 
markets and outlines potential countermeasures for policymakers and law enforcement 
professionals engaged in the fight against this phenomenon. Our point of departure 
is a review of the threat we face in this area, bringing together the latest findings from 
international research, fresh empirical data, operational information and intelligence. This 
analysis provides us with the opportunity to identify priority areas for targeted actions, 
and leads us to the conclusion that Europe needs greater investment and continuous 
innovation, if we are to keep pace with the challenges we face in this area.
For this report, the EMCDDA and Europol have combined the latest available data and 
outlined law enforcement strategies to reduce criminal opportunities in the darknet 
ecosystem. We present a multidisciplinary analysis of how darknet markets function and 
how they relate to criminal behaviour. We explore the implications of this for drug control 
policies, research and monitoring approaches, and law enforcement activities. We would 
like to particularly acknowledge the input from experts in academia and law enforcement 
officials, without which this report would not have been possible.
This analysis is timely, following the recent takedown, in July 2017, of Alphabay and Hansa, 
two of the largest darknet markets. We can learn from this achievement, while at the same 
time recognising that those involved in the online trade in drugs are likely to be quick to 
adapt and develop new strategies and business models to reduce the risk of detection. This 
means that on-going research, monitoring and surveillance will remain critically important 
for both agencies. We believe that the new insights provided by this joint EMCDDA–Europol 
analysis will make an important contribution to informing and preparing Europe’s response 
to the growing threat posed by darknet drug sales. The online trade in illicit goods and 
services has been recognised as a key threat to the safety of EU citizens in the SOCTA 2017 
and is being tackled as part of the EU’s coordinated response to serious and organised 
crime – the EU Policy Cycle for organised and serious international crime from 2018 to 
2021. Our analysis is necessarily forward-looking, as the challenges we face in this area 
are constantly evolving. It demonstrates the added value of bringing together the analytical 
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expertise of both agencies, allowing us to approach the topic with scientific rigour and the 
informed perspective that comes from operational experience. Our successful partnership 
also underlines, in our view, one of the key messages running throughout this report: 
European-level cooperation and coordination are likely to be critically important for an 
effective response in this area.
Alexis Goosdeel     Rob Wainwright
Director, EMCDDA    Executive Director, Europol
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Report background and context
Developments in information technology are transforming many aspects of modern life and 
this includes the way that illicit goods are traded. This report focuses on online anonymous 
markets (or ‘cryptomarkets’). Such markets are a relatively recent development that enables 
sellers and buyers to transact online without disclosing any personal details, hence creating 
a considerable degree of anonymity. This development has led to the proliferation of the 
trade in illicit goods online, and it is now recognised as a growth area for the activities 
of organised crime in the European Union (EU) that is undermining conventional law 
enforcement approaches. It is estimated that about two thirds of the offers on darknet 
markets are drug related, with the remainder related to a range of other illicit goods and 
services. However, any analysis has to be made with caution because of not only the 
difficulties inherent in monitoring developments but also simply the pace of change in this 
extremely dynamic area.
Europol’s 2017 European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(EU SOCTA) identified the online trade in illicit goods and services as one of the engines 
of organised crime. An improved intelligence picture and a coordinated law enforcement 
approach across the EU in addressing criminality on the darknet are now at the heart of the 
EU Policy Cycle for organised and serious international crime (2018-2021). This has been 
reflected in law enforcement approaches, as illustrated by two recent significant coordinated 
international law enforcement operations on two of the largest darknet markets.
Structure of the report
This report has three main chapters. The first reviews the key concepts necessary to 
understand the development of darknet markets. The second chapter highlights the 
growing importance of this area for drug sales within the EU through the presentation of 
an analysis of market activity. This includes an analysis of drug supply on global darknet 
markets (2011-2015). The analysis focuses on drug supply originating from the EU, and 
includes an assessment of the relative significance of EU suppliers in both the global 
darknet drug trade and the overall European retail drug market. This second chapter then 
also considers non-English language darknet markets for specific European countries, 
before providing an analysis focused on AlphaBay — one of the largest markets to have 
existed thus far — from its original emergence to its recent closure (2015-2017). In the 
third chapter, the darknet phenomenon is reviewed from a law-enforcement perspective. 
Not only are the challenges for law enforcement elaborated, but examples of successful 
recent actions are also provided, which are useful for informing discussions on future 
interventions in this area. Taken together, this analysis provides a comprehensive but 
accessible policy-orientated review, intended to facilitate discussions at EU level on how to 
respond to the growth of darknet drug markets. This is accompanied by the identification of 
key priority areas that require attention and where activities are likely to have most impact. 
When interpreting the findings from any analysis of this topic, the considerable difficulties 
of collecting data on an area of activity that is, by definition, designed to remain hidden 
needs to be borne in mind. Notwithstanding this, some key findings and recommendations 
for action emerge from this report.
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Understanding the threat
All markets, including illicit ones, function to facilitate the exchange of goods or services. 
Therefore, markets will prosper if they confer advantages to both buyers and sellers. 
Considerations for consumers can include the level of choice, ease of availability, 
convenience, perceived quality and price. For illicit drug markets, the level of risk is also an 
important factor, as vendors and consumers will be attracted to markets that are associated 
with relatively low risks of detection, experiencing market-related violence and ‘rip offs’. 
Darknet markets provide a convenient sales channel to technologically knowledgeable 
customers. This approach to drug sales appears to have considerable potential to grow. It 
is possible that darknet markets will disrupt traditional drug markets in the same way as 
has been seen in some areas for legitimate commodities. This is especially likely to occur if 
darknet markets become more accessible to new consumers and are viewed as a relatively 
low-risk way of acquiring drugs.
Importantly, such changes will not occur in isolation but will be influenced by other 
developments in the illicit drug market. These may include the potential use of other 
technologies and platforms; the overall impact of law enforcement and regulatory efforts; 
and broader social and policy developments which may shape the supply of and demand 
for drugs in more general ways. The need to keep pace with changes in this area is 
illustrated by the fact that, recently, evidence has emerged of the use of instant messaging 
and social media applications using GPS (global positioning system) technologies for 
drug distribution in some European cities. This underlines the need for the systematic 
monitoring and assessment of the anonymous online ecosystem, conducted in the context 
of understanding the operation of the illicit drug market overall.
A number of potential threats can be identified that may increase the challenges of 
responding to online-facilitated drug transactions. These include the development of 
decentralised software and new encryption technology; new forms of parcel delivery and 
collection systems; the greater integration of darknet markets with existing local drug 
markets; nationally based darknet markets; and the growing use of GPS-enabled apps for 
distribution at the local level.
Key findings
 The trade in illicit drugs on darknet markets is a dynamic area subject to rapid change 
as marketplaces appear and disappear. Overall, the importance of this area seems to be 
expanding and it now affects most EU Member States in some way.
 When compared with current estimates of the annual retail value of the overall EU drug 
market, sales volumes on darknet markets are currently modest, but are significant and 
have the potential to grow.
 EU-based suppliers are important players in the darknet ecosystem. In the 2011-2015 
period, they accounted for around 46 % of all drug sales in terms of revenue on the 
darknet markets analysed.
 Between 2015 and 2017 on AlphaBay, which, at the time, was the largest darknet 
marketplace, EU-based suppliers accounted for around 28 % of all drug sales.
 In both study periods Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were the most 
important countries with respect to EU-based darknet drug supply. Stimulant drugs 
represented the majority of all European drug sales.
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 New psychoactive substances (NPS) are less commonly sold than illicit drugs on the 
darknet market, probably reflecting the significant role played by surface web sales in 
this sector. The United Kingdom was the most frequently noted origin of NPS sales, 
which may reflect both patterns of demand and recent changes in legislation.
 The rationale underpinning darknet markets suggests that they will be most commonly 
used for mid- or low-volume market sales or sales directly to consumers. This is 
supported by the data presented here. Large-volume sales (wholesale) are relatively 
uncommon.
 The highest market activity in terms of number of transactions was observed at the retail 
level, and retail sales values were greatest for cannabis and cocaine. The picture was 
different for MDMA and opioids, however, where mid-level sales represented a relatively 
large proportion of all sales (although still less in absolute terms), and the value of the 
mid-level sales was greater than the value of the retail sales. This suggests that darknet 
markets may play a different role in the supply chain for these substances.
 Law enforcement interventions in the form of darknet market takedowns disrupt darknet 
markets, although the overall ecosystem appears to be fairly resilient with new markets 
quickly becoming established.
 Significant knowledge gaps exist with respect to the role of traditional organised crime 
groups (OCGs) in darknet markets. In particular, the extent to which OCGs are involved 
in the production, trafficking and distribution of drugs supplied on online markets is 
unclear.
Conclusions and recommendations
There are obvious methodological and practical difficulties that need to be taken into 
consideration in any analysis of darknet markets. Despite these limitations, the data 
presented in this report allow us to draw some conclusions that support recommendations 
for action. An important caveat here is that, as the pace of change is considerable in this 
area, any recommendations will require regular review. Conclusions and recommendations 
are grouped together according to their relevance to law enforcement practice, monitoring 
and research, and policy development. It should be noted that, while this approach is 
conceptually helpful, it results in some unavoidable overlap.
Law enforcement
 Established and proven intelligence-led policing approaches, conducted in a 
technologically coordinated and collaborative manner, are likely to be important 
components if law enforcement activities are to have a sustained impact.
 There is a need for capacity building and increased investment. EU Member States are 
often faced with significant skills gaps for conducting investigations on the darknet, and 
many authorities lack experts who have both a technical understanding of cybercrime 
investigation and expertise in operational drug-related crime activities. Capacity-building 
efforts in this area also need to consider the needs of the judiciary.
 The resilience of the online ecosystem to targeted market disruption and the scale and 
diversity of drug market activity mean that operational models appropriate for addressing 
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illicit firearms or crimes against children may not be directly transferable to, or sufficient 
for, tackling online drug supply.
 In order to prevent the displacement of activities to new or other existing marketplaces, 
authorities need to pursue a multi-agency approach to target the latter. In addition to 
targeting individual marketplaces, this implies the need to prioritise other high-level 
threats and/or targets (major vendors or their suppliers), engage with industry and 
develop other measures.
 Since a small number of vendors appear to be responsible for a disproportionately 
large volume of overall sales, specialist law enforcement tactics should prioritise 
investigations that will have the largest impact. This prioritisation should be done 
on the basis of predefined high-value, high-number, or high-risk transaction criteria 
following an intelligence-led policing approach. Identifying the origin of drugs sold on 
the darknet market is important for both targeting law enforcement efforts and a better 
understanding of overall market dynamics.
 Pooling capacity resources by, for instance, establishing darknet investigations units, 
joint operational international taskforces and coordinated actions such as cyberpatrolling 
is likely to improve efficiency and enhance the strategic understanding of the role of the 
darknet trade in drugs in serious and organised crime, as well as mitigating some of the 
investigative challenges in the field.
 The success of law enforcement operations against cyber-enabled crime often depends 
on the cooperation of technology industry actors. In this context, there is a need for 
standardised rules of engagement with private industry and the development of flexible 
cooperation models that can allow effective action while striking an appropriate balance 
between the interests of individuals, the general public and businesses concerned.
Research and monitoring
 There is a need to further increase and develop monitoring capacity to support the 
strategic analysis required to inform future policy and operational responses, and reduce 
both the health- and security-related threats deriving from the online supply of drugs and 
other illicit commodities.
 Existing early warning approaches may be limited to detecting changes in drug 
consumption once they have already been established. This can be improved by 
supplementing such systems with data and information on darknet drug market sales.
 There is evidence that drugs bought on the darknet are likely to be intended for 
redistribution or supply on local markets (based on revenue and transaction-size data). 
Further investigation should be conducted into the destination of drugs bought on the 
darknet.
 Research is needed to explore the interaction between traditional drug markets and 
darknet drug markets. This should include consideration of how consumers view these 
different marketplaces and their relative impacts on health risks and harm.
 Future research and monitoring activities should address national non-English-language 
markets — the study of such markets will improve understanding and provide insights 
into the interactions between traditional offline and darknet market drug flows and 
networks.
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Policy
 Health and security issues related to drug markets are increasingly interlinked. This 
needs to be recognised, and synergies between relevant actors in EU Member States, 
EU institutions and relevant agencies need to be further developed to allow the 
development of more joined-up and integrated responses.
 The dynamic nature of online markets, their ability to evolve to respond to threats and 
exploit new opportunities, and the introduction or adoption of new technologies mean 
that enhanced monitoring capacity in this area is crucial to ensure that responses keep 
pace with new developments.
 In the light of the relative ease and convenience of the darknet as a sales channel, 
it is essential that measures are considered to prevent and discourage consumers 
from using online platforms for obtaining drugs. This will require the development of 
appropriate prevention and risk communication approaches.
 Existing legislation should be reviewed and, if necessary, adapted to provide a more 
harmonised legal environment — to equip the judiciary and law enforcement authorities 
with the tools they need to respond in a more coordinated manner to criminality on the 
darknet.
 The complex nature of criminality on the darknet requires a multi-agency and 
collaborative approach. At the European level, the EU Policy Cycle provides an important 
platform for achieving this.
 Engagement with key industries, such as the information technology, social media, 
payment services, and commercial product distribution and collection industries, is likely 
to be increasingly important for both identifying new threats in this area and developing 
effective responses.
 Engagement with the private sector and the research community is also likely to be 
increasingly important as a means of leveraging the expertise held outside the remit of 
law enforcement to identify new threats and combat the existing ones.
1
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This chapter outlines the scope and 
aims of the report. It introduces the key 
concepts and themes used throughout 
the chapters, including the online 
anonymous marketplaces and the 
various technologies at play.
1.1 Scope and aims of this report
Illicit trade on darknet markets is recognised as one of the 
engines of organised crime in the European Union (EU). It 
is estimated that about two-thirds of the offers on darknet 
markets are drug related, with the remainder related to a 
range of other illicit goods and services (see Figure 1.1) (1). 
(1) Based on active listings data from AlphaBay, Dream Market, Hansa, 
TradeRoute and Valhalla darknet marketplaces, spanning from the 
launch of each marketplace through to 21 August 2017 (or market 
closure). It should be noted that the number of listings is susceptible to 
manipulation to serve the purposes of the vendors or the marketplace.
This report focuses on online drug sales. More specifically, 
it examines sales that are carried out on an encrypted part 
of the internet called the darknet. It does not cover drug 
sales on the surface web, that is, the part of the internet 
that can be accessed through typical search engines such 
as Google and Bing. The darknet is part of the deep web, 
the part of the internet that is not accessible by standard 
web browsers, but is used for storing encrypted data 
such as government files and personal banking records 
(EMCDDA, 2016a).
This report is intended to stimulate further discussion on 
the topic of drugs available on online anonymous markets 
by providing a conceptual framework for understanding the 
key components, empirical sales data with an EU focus and 
additional, new market analysis. It sheds light on the darknet 
markets and highlights some of the implications for the EU, 
as well as addressing the challenges they pose for policy and 
law enforcement.
FIGURE 1.1
Darknet markets content
Drugs and drug-related chemicals
Illicit drugsPharmaceuticals Drug-related 
chemicals
Other
Fraud and counterfeit, 44 %
Guides and tutorials, 30 %
Other, 19 %
Hacking and malware, 5 %
Firearms and explosives, 2 %
62 %
77 %
18 %
5 %
38 %
Source: Web-IQ (2017).
CHAPTER 1 
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1.2 Background
The very first online drug transaction is thought to have 
taken place in the early 1970s and involved cannabis 
exchange between students at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) and Stanford University (Markoff, 
2005). Illicit drugs have therefore been sold on the internet 
in small volumes almost since its inception. Web-based 
discussion forums, related to drug use and manufacture, 
have also been present online since the late 1990s (2). 
It is only recently, however, that, fuelled by the global 
proliferation of powerful communications and encryption 
technologies, illicit drugs have become much more readily 
accessible online.
The earliest modern online anonymous markets, often 
referred to as darknet markets (Owen and Savage, 2016) or 
cryptomarkets (Martin, 2014), appeared in early 2010 (see 
Figure 1.2), and evolved from an encrypted email service 
and migrated on to a Tor (The Onion Router) anonymity 
network to guarantee better anonymity to users (Schwartz, 
2012).
A number of key terms used in this report are explained 
here, and a more elaborate glossary of terms is provided at 
the end of the report.
1.3 Darknet markets
Darknet markets consist of websites, which are in many 
ways similar to other online platforms that facilitate 
trade, such as eBay or Amazon. The key difference is the 
anonymity afforded by accessing darknet markets. Access 
to such markets can be achieved in a number of ways. 
Commonly, there are surface websites that provide listings 
of ‘.onion’ addresses for darknet markets, thus enabling 
ready access; there are also mirror sites on the surface 
web that provide hyperlinks to corresponding hidden sites; 
and there are ‘invitation-only’ markets where users need 
to be referred by a current user (see Figure 1.2). Among 
the technologies used to achieve this are anonymisation 
services, encrypted communication services and 
cryptocurrencies, each one of which mitigates the risk of 
detection of the buyers and sellers and presents its own 
particular challenges to investigators.
The first darknet market of notoriety was Silk Road, which 
opened at the end of January 2011 and was seized by the 
(2) The Hive is one of these earlier forums: https://the-hive.archive.erowid.
org/ (accessed on 19 September 2017).
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in October 2013 
(DEA, 2013). Silk Road 2.0 was launched soon after the 
original Silk Road was seized and since that time there has 
been a proliferation of darknet markets, with an estimate of 
over 100 markets having emerged to date.
Markets close for a number of reasons. Based on an 
analysis of the closure of 89 online marketplaces, the most 
common reason for closure thus far is a so-called ‘exit 
scam’, where the market operators close the site down 
suddenly, taking the money held in escrow without fulfilling 
the orders (n = 31). The next most common reason for 
closure is ‘voluntary exit’, where the market is closed with 
the mutual consent of those involved and without known 
losses to users (n = 24). Law enforcement may also decide 
to target markets and close them down (n = 14). Finally, a 
market closure may be precipitated by a hack or as a result 
of de-anonymisation (n = 11). For 2 of the 89 marketplaces 
studied, it could not be established, based on the available 
sources, whether the closure occurred as a result of a 
scam or a hack, and in 7 cases the reason is unknown 
(Figure 1.2).
On average, the darknet markets observed (n = 
103) remained active for just over eight months 
(8.5 months ± 10.1 months). The most enduring 
markets (n = 3: Valhalla, Dream Market and Outlaw 
Market) operated for a mean of just under four years (43 
months ± 2.0 months). Nine marketplaces (Silk Road, 
AlphaBay, Silk Road 3.0, Black Market Reloaded, T•chka, 
Diabolus/SR3, The Farmer’s Market, Darknet Heroes 
League and Crypto Market) lasted for a period of between 
two and three years (28.4 months ± 2.8 months), and a 
further group of 13 marketplaces (Hansa, Agora, Nucleus 
Marketplace, TheRealDeal, Acropolis, Middle Earth 
Marketplace, Apple Market, BlackBank Market, House of 
Lions Market, Evolution, Silk Road Reloaded, Silk Road 
2.0 and Anarchia) lasted for between one and two years 
(16.2 months ± 3.2 months). The majority of marketplaces 
(n = 78) did not last more than a year — the average 
duration in this group is just under four months (3.8 
months ± 3.5 months). In this latter group, 14 marketplaces 
were operational for less than one month. No start date 
could be determined for the OW Market and it was 
therefore not included in the analysis.
At the time of writing, there appeared to be 14 active and 
operational marketplaces (Valhalla, Dream Market, Silk 
Road 3.0, T•chka, Darknet Heroes League, Apple Market, 
House of Lions Market, TradeRoute, Wall Street Market, 
RSClub Market, Zion Market, Infinite Market, CGMC and 
OW Market) — these have been in existence for between 
2 and 45 months (mean 18.3 months ± 14.8 months).
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CHAPTER 1  I Key concepts
F
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E
 1
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 d
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 d
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What drugs are offered on the darknet?
Once the darknet has been accessed using Tor software, it 
is possible to use the built-in search engine capabilities to 
browse the items offered. The format of the Google search 
engine has been appropriated in the form of Grams, a well-
known search engine associated with finding illicit goods 
and services (see box on page 21).
With regard to looking at the drugs on offer, each 
marketplace lists the categories of substances in its own 
way. This is typically by category of drug, such as stimulants 
or opioids, though categorisation may not be systematic. 
For example, in the opioids category, other relevant drug 
types such as benzodiazepines may be listed. In some 
cases, categories have been intentionally misdeclared to 
promote them to users of other drugs (Duxbury and Haynie, 
2017) or perhaps even to prevent drawing the attention 
of law enforcement. New psychoactive substances (NPS) 
appear to play a relatively minor role in the darknet drug 
market when compared with their presence on the surface 
web (Dolliver and Kuhns, 2016; Roxburgh et al., 2017). The 
level of retail transactions for NPS on the surface web is 
expected to be far greater than on the darknet (Van Buskirk 
et al., 2017a; Van Hout and Hearne, 2017; Wadsworth et al., 
2017).
Currently, it would appear that precursors are not 
traded significantly on the darknet. This may reflect the 
fact that most precursor trading is conducted through 
established, existing links between organised crime 
groups (OCGs). Alternatively, it is also possible that some 
unregulated pre-precursors are sourced from commercial 
chemical websites in a similar way to that seen for some 
NPS. Given the potential for precursor availability to 
impact on drug manufacture, particularly in the area of 
synthetic drug production, it is important to monitor this 
area closely.
1.4 Dark techniques in the light
Anonymisation services
Anonymisation services enable aspects of internet activity 
to be anonymised, meaning that they allow users to browse 
the web without revealing their identity or location. They 
also allow content to be anonymously hosted by disguising 
where a server is located — a feature known as hidden 
services (Biryukov et al., 2013). Because of these features, 
darknet marketplaces can sell illicit products in a relatively 
open fashion, providing an illusion of anonymity to the 
users. While anonymisation services have to a large degree 
been misappropriated for illicit, often criminal, activity, this 
was not their original purpose (see box opposite) and there 
are many legitimate reasons for which individuals may wish 
to protect their anonymity online.
The legitimate use of anonymisation 
services
In addition to their illicit functions, there are valid 
uses for anonymisation services. The origins 
of Tor, the most prominent network supporting 
cryptographically hidden sites, can be traced back 
to the early 1990s and the US Naval Research 
Laboratory and, subsequently, to a collaborative 
project between independent developers and the 
non-profit organisation Free Haven Project (Dingledine 
et al., 2004). The intention was to provide anonymous 
access to the internet in politically repressive regimes.
These services are legal to download and there are 
legitimate reasons for using them. It is estimated 
that about 3-6 % of overall Tor traffic involves hidden 
services (1). As of May 2017, there were about 
2 million daily Tor users and around 5 000 hidden 
services (2). It is difficult to estimate what proportion 
of hidden services on Tor relate to some form of illicit 
activity; however, one study indicates this to be more 
than half (Moore and Rid, 2016). The secrecy of these 
services, however, and the methodological challenges 
of monitoring this area make it difficult to reach 
accurate conclusions.
(1) Recent assessments by the Tor Project gauge hidden-services 
traffic to constitute 3-6 % of the overall traffic in the Tor network. 
For a technical breakdown, see ‘Some Statistics about Onions’, Tor 
Project, https://blog.torproject.org/blog/33 (accessed on 16 June 
2017).
(2) Recent metrics by the Tor Project, available at https://metrics.
torproject.org (accessed on 16 June 2017).
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Grams website
Launched in April 2014, Grams was one of the first 
search engines for Tor-based darknet markets, designed 
to resemble and work in a similar way to surface web 
search engines.
Since its launch, Grams has been upgraded many 
times to improve the functionality and user experience. 
Features have been added to promote specific keyword 
or key phrase searches, to provide a bitcoin tumbling/
mixing service, and to provide easy access to darknet 
markets through redirection and a network for publishers 
and advertisers.
Grams may be useful as a point of departure for general 
research on darknet markets, as it has a convenient and 
familiar, user-friendly interface, therefore potentially 
making the darknet more accessible.
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Most commonly, darknet markets use Tor’s hidden service 
model (Dingledine et al., 2004). Tor is free software that 
enables online anonymity using a process known as onion 
routing, which encrypts data and transmits them through 
a series of network nodes. Tor is, however, not the only 
software used for this purpose. There are also markets 
on I2P (the Invisible Internet Project) and other networks, 
although, currently, these networks are significantly smaller 
in scope and less popular than Tor (Everett, 2009). It 
should be noted again here that it is immensely difficult 
to accurately gauge darknet market sizes for numerous 
methodological reasons, including the fact that the metrics 
vary greatly, including traffic, users, relays and other 
features (Moore and Rid, 2016).
Other unique anonymising software packages, such as 
Freenet, have been around for a while. More recently, 
OpenBazaar has attempted to create decentralised 
markets, with potential support for anonymous 
communication. These efforts essentially implement 
anonymous peer-to-peer networks, which can be accessed 
via free downloadable applications. In this type of network, 
information is not stored on or transferred via centralised 
servers, but is encrypted and distributed to every computer 
on the network. The users do not know what files are 
stored on their computer, and files shared on the network 
are duplicated across several computers, ensuring that 
the content will be accessible if some devices become 
unavailable. This decentralised model poses further 
challenges to law enforcement, as there is no single server 
in a single jurisdiction on which to focus enforcement 
efforts.
Encrypted communication
Because of the illicit nature of the business conducted on 
online anonymous markets, many users decide to encrypt 
their communications. The most common message 
encryption programme used is PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). 
Created in 1991, it works with the use of ‘pairs of keys’, 
with each pair comprising a public key, used to encrypt 
messages, and a private key, used to decrypt them.
Essentials for encrypted exchange
To enable transactions to take place between a buyer and a 
seller without either being vulnerable, there are five crucial 
conditions that need to be met (based on Moore and Rid, 
2016):
1. Privacy: the participants in the transaction need to 
be able to communicate without the risk of such 
communication being intercepted. In traditional 
postal mail, this can be achieved by placing the 
communication material in a sealed envelope. In 
virtual communication, participants use cryptographic 
systems such as public key encryption. This is 
effectively impossible to decode without access to the 
private key and this twin-key system eliminates a main 
vulnerability of encoded communication — the point at 
which participants agree on the code to be used.
2. Anonymity: as well as the communication being secure 
from outside observers, the identity of the sender must 
also be concealed. In the case of traditional postal 
mail, the equivalent is for the sender to not put their 
name or address on the letter and envelope. For online 
communication, Tor allows this through anonymous 
accounts and onion routing.
3. Authentication: each party needs to be sure that 
communication is genuinely coming from the other; 
the equivalent in a traditional, posted letter would be 
a hand-written signature. Most secure communication 
systems also feature authentication mechanisms.
4. Hidden exchange: in order to achieve secure 
transactions, the seller needs to be able to set and 
run their marketplace without exposure. Outside 
cyberspace, this is possible for traders who operate 
without licences or permanent premises. Back-alley 
deals for drugs, weapons and other illicit goods and 
services fit these criteria. In darknet environments, 
hidden services such as those offered on Tor allow 
the setting up and running of online markets without 
disclosure.
5. Payment: for a transaction to be secure, it is vital that 
the payment cannot be traced back to the buyer. In the 
real world, a buyer can ensure this by paying in cash. In 
virtual transactions, cryptocurrencies are used.
These five points may be exploited as vulnerabilities when 
investigating encrypted transactions.
Cryptocurrencies
Anonymisation services allow buyers and sellers to 
interact without revealing their identities. However, for 
complete anonymity to be achieved, the financial side of 
the transaction must also be carried out anonymously. 
Darknet marketplaces achieve this through the use of 
cryptocurrencies. Probably the most well-known example is 
bitcoin, introduced in 2008 by an anonymous individual (or 
group) using the name Satoshi Nakamoto. The aim was to 
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remove the need to trust governments or other political and 
financial institutions (as is inherent in all fiat currencies) 
and instead base it on a trust in cryptography. Bitcoins are 
designed to be free from control and interference from 
outside institutions and to be self-managed by an online 
community (Nakamoto, 2009).
Cryptocurrencies have been associated with erratic 
and often dramatic shifts in the currency market, thus 
presenting opportunities for gains and losses for those 
reliant on them. However, despite this volatility there 
also still appears to be a growing interest in the use of 
these new payment forms, provided that they will in 
future be seen as a trustworthy and reliable medium for 
exchange. Greater commercial and public adoption of 
cryptocurrencies, should it occur, is also likely to have 
implications for their use for criminal purposes.
All bitcoin transactions dating back to when the currency 
was first established are recorded in the blockchain, a large, 
public (unencrypted) database. The blockchain is not in a 
central location; rather it is stored by thousands of individuals 
and companies around the globe running bitcoin software. 
Therefore, a buyer’s transaction can be traced back to the 
point at which the bitcoin was purchased through a process 
known as blockchain analysis (Simonite, 2013). In order to 
ensure that their identity is concealed, users can employ 
a number of techniques, and in some cases the markets 
themselves provide these services. Tumbling/mixing is a 
popular way of obscuring traces of bitcoin coming from a 
darknet market — two tumblers (BitBlender and Grams 
Helix) are available to AlphaBay users (Figure 1.3). There 
are also third-party applications, such as Bitcoin Fog, which 
conceal the destination of a user’s coins to the point at which 
blockchain analysis becomes exceptionally difficult.
FIGURE 1.3
Example of AlphaBay announcement on tumbling services available to users
Features of bitcoin
Digital: bitcoin is based on only electronic records. 
There is no gold or other tangible asset supporting 
bitcoin.
Decentralised: the system managing bitcoin is 
decentralised through the use of a peer-to-peer 
network. Every member of the network has software 
that distributes the management of the currency.
Open source: the software needed to acquire and use 
bitcoin is free and available to anyone.
Public ledger: all bitcoin transactions are recorded in 
a public ledger called the blockchain, stored on the 
decentralised network. When a transaction is made 
with bitcoin, this is entered in the ledger, preventing 
the user from spending the bitcoin twice.
Generated through mining: new bitcoins can be 
generated through a process called mining, which 
enables the creation of a new blockchain.
How does bitcoin work?
Bitcoin is a decentralised, cryptographically secure 
digital currency that enables peer-to-peer payments 
between any two people in the world without relying 
on government or regulatory oversight. To acquire 
bitcoin, users first create a wallet. This is represented 
by a unique identifier that does not reveal the identity 
of its owner. When someone acquires (a fraction of) 
bitcoin, either from exchange websites or through a 
transaction with another party, it is transferred into 
their wallet and the blockchain is updated to reflect 
the change of ownership.
When someone wishes to pay for a transaction 
with bitcoin, they send a message on the bitcoin 
peer-to-peer network, indicating that bitcoin will be 
transferred from their wallet to the vendor’s wallet. 
The network will confirm that they control this wallet 
and that the buyer has not already spent this bitcoin. 
Once this is verified, the bitcoin will be transferred 
and the blockchain will reflect that it is now owned by 
the vendor. The process is identical regardless of the 
nature of the transaction — licit or illicit.
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While Bitcoin remains the preferred cryptocurrency, 
alternative ones have been developed that copy some of 
its features. Some of the most-cited currencies are Litecoin 
(Vejačka, 2014), Dogecoin (Markus, 2013), Zcash (Ben-
Sasson et al., 2014), Ethereum (Wood, 2014), Darkcoin 
(Greenberg, 2014) and Monero (2017). These seek to 
solve some of the limitations of Bitcoin, including having 
concealment features already built in.
Many darknet marketplaces have adopted and offer an 
extra layer of financial security for their users — an escrow 
service. In a basic escrow system, when a buyer orders 
an item the fee is held by a third party and provided to 
the seller only once the buyer has confirmed that they 
have received the goods. More advanced escrow systems 
use multisignature, or multisig, transactions. This means 
that instead of just the buyer confirming their successful 
order and releasing the funds, two out of the three parties 
involved — the buyer, the seller and the market — need to 
sign off the transaction. While markets might offer multisig 
escrow, it is not always chosen for use. Figure 1.4 shows 
the guide for multisig transactions on AlphaBay.
FIGURE 1.4
Example of multisig transaction instructions 
on AlphaBay
Extract from website reads as follows:
…here is how a multisig works:
1) Both the buyer and the seller must have set their public 
Multisig key in their profile.
2) The buyer deposits 4% of the item value in his AlphaBay 
wallet to cover market fees.
3) The buyer purchases the item, then a multisig Bitcoin 
address is generated using the buyer’s key, seller’s key, 
and a market-generated public key (2/3). Both parties 
can use this publicly-viewable information to verify the 
authenticity of the address.
4) The buyer sends money to this address, and the seller 
ships the goods.
5) If the buyer is happy, he finalizes, and the seller receives 
the market private key.
6) In case of dispute or refund, the buyer receives the 
private key.
7) Whoever got the private key will use it, along with his 
own private key, to claim the coins.
To make it simple: buy the product, and you get a BTC 
address to send the coins to. Seller gets the private key 
when you finalize. You get the key if you dispute and win.
This is a fool-proof method to avoid exit scams. You never 
give your private key to anyone.
Excerpt from AlphaBay 
(accessed 12 June 2017)
The alternative, more risky option for the buyer is to finalise 
early, often shown on listings as ‘FE’ (see Figure 1.5b). 
This potentially involves paying a reduced price with the 
incentive of receiving the purchased items without the 
delay involved in the escrow system.
1.5 Research on darknet markets
There is a growing body of research on various aspects of 
darknet markets, including attempts to measure the size 
of these markets, the substances available and whether or 
not this differs geographically, the characteristics of those 
using darknet markets, the motivations for using darknet 
markets, and toxicology testing of the drugs purchased on 
darknet markets.
In interpreting these findings, it is important to recognise 
the methodological and practical difficulties of conducting 
research on and in relation to darknet markets. Sample 
sizes are often small for example, and formal statistical 
sampling methods are impractical. Studies may consider 
only a subset of markets or geographical locations; thus, 
it cannot be assumed that the results are necessarily 
representative. In addition, these markets are dynamic, 
and change occurs rapidly. Despite these limitations, the 
available data are informative and also highlight areas 
requiring further investigation and monitoring.
Buyer characteristics
Research has investigated demographic information on 
those purchasing drugs through darknet markets. Van Hout 
and Bingham (2013a) reported on a convenience sample 
of 20 adult Silk Road users. The majority were male, had a 
history of drug use (ranging from 18 months to 25 years) 
and were in professional employment or tertiary education. 
These results are similar to those found in another study of 
17 respondents (Barratt et al., 2016a): most (15/17) were 
male with a median age of 21-25 years. These data are 
broadly consistent with the demographic characteristics 
of those that reported buying drugs online in the 2016 
Global Drug Survey (GDS) sample. This is an online self-
nomination survey — and, while it is not representative in 
any formal statistical sense, it does benefit from having 
a large number of participants. Of those completing the 
online questionnaire who had purchased drugs on the 
internet, two thirds were male, with a mean age of 28.7 
years (47 % were 24 or younger; 23 % were 35 or older). 
Interestingly, in terms of the total sample of drug users, 
almost 1 in 10 participants (9.3 %) reported buying drugs 
from a darknet market at least once (GDS, 2016). It should 
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be noted, however, that it is possible that, since this was 
an online drug survey, the sample may have been biased 
towards those who are more comfortable with an online 
environment. Similarly, based on an Australian sample 
of 800 stimulant drug users and data from face-to-face 
surveys, Van Buskirk et al. (2016) found that 9 % of 
participants had purchased substances on the darknet in 
the past year. However, these data are limited to Australian 
users from urban centres. It would therefore be interesting 
to further compare these results with results collected 
through other methods.
Motives for buying and selling online
In terms of users’ motives for purchasing drugs on the 
darknet, existing studies tend to highlight the same issues. 
Online buyers perceive that higher quality products are 
available online than are available from alternative sources 
(Van Hout and Bingham, 2013a; Barratt et al., 2014). 
Barratt et al. (2014), using data from the GDS, found that 
those who used Silk Road to purchase drugs had done so 
because it offered a wider range of drugs, better quality 
and greater convenience than was usually available 
offline. It has also been suggested that purchasing from 
the darknet enables customers to buy from vendors 
located in the countries where the drug production 
takes place, in particular MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy-N-
methylamphetamine) from the Netherlands (Van Hout and 
Bingham, 2013b), presumably reflecting a consumer view 
that higher quality products may be sourced from known 
production areas. Décary-Hétu et al. (2016) reported that 
the majority of vendors on Silk Road were willing to take the 
risk of shipping drugs internationally, making these drugs 
much more readily available, at lower costs, to a larger 
geographical area. This has been suggested to be the case 
for cocaine shipments to Australia, for example, and MDMA 
shipments more generally.
Avoiding violence and other risks
Understanding the motivations of those buying drugs 
online is important for assessing the potential for darknet 
markets to prosper. Monitoring drug users’ attitudes to 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of purchasing 
drugs from online and from more traditional sources is 
informative. It has been suggested that darknet markets 
might be attractive to buyers, as they are perceived to 
be safer environments in which to buy drugs because 
of the removal of face-to-face transactions with dealers, 
which have the potential to end in violence should things 
go wrong (Barratt et al., 2016b). However, the extent to 
which this occurs is likely to vary considerably according 
to the organisation of drug markets in different locations. 
Overall, not all drug markets are characterised by the risk 
of violence (Coomber, 2015). Moreover, many drug users 
obtain their drugs through peer or friendship networks, so 
the extent to which obtaining drugs places users at risk of 
violence or other problems is likely to be highly variable.
While the risks of direct contact with drug sellers may 
be removed by buying drugs online, there are other risks 
involved in purchasing from darknet markets. While 
the seller’s location remains anonymous in online drug 
transactions, a delivery address is required for the buyer. 
This leaves the recipient open to the risk of doxing — the 
practice of publishing identifying information about an 
individual. This may result in exposure to the risk of fraud 
and blackmail (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016), as well as 
coming to the attention of law enforcement.
Perceived quality of drugs purchased 
online
Consumer views about the perceived ‘quality’ of drugs 
purchased on the darknet being higher than those 
brought through street markets has also been suggested 
as a motivation for using darknet markets. Again, this 
is an area requiring further research, but some studies, 
where drugs have been bought on darknet markets and 
subject to testing in a laboratory, suggest that there is a 
high probability (greater than 90 %) that what is ordered 
will subsequently be delivered (Caudevilla et al., 2016; 
Rhumorbarbe et al., 2016). However, in some cases 
the purity was overstated; for example, samples of 1 g 
of cocaine advertised at greater than 95 % purity were 
determined to contain 33 % and 30 % cocaine when tested. 
An important caveat here is that this study analysed a 
very small number of samples, so any conclusions need 
to made with caution and more data are needed to better 
judge the extent to which drugs offered on darknet markets 
match the advertised products. Some commentators 
have suggested that, by providing a more reliable source 
of drugs, darknet markets may reduce some of the risks 
associated with consuming unknown or contaminated 
products. There are some clear public health risks 
associated with the misselling of drugs in respect of their 
composition, purity and possible contaminants. This, 
however, does not imply that having access to highly pure 
or potent drugs necessarily reduces risks, as such purity 
can also represent a hazard in its own right. Data in this 
area based on user evaluations of product quality — which 
are often positive with regard to darknet sales — are 
supportive of the limited forensic information. Assessments 
of quality based on user evaluations cannot, however, 
simply be taken at face value, as they will be influenced 
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by factors including the users’ levels of experience, the 
purpose of using the drugs purchased and the context of 
use (Bancroft and Reid, 2015). In summary, the limited data 
that exist would suggest that darknet markets are generally 
regarded as reliable by those that use them in respect of 
receiving the substance that was expected. It is possible to 
postulate that online sales could possibly reduce or elevate 
some of the health risks associated with purchasing drugs, 
as compared with those sourced through street markets. 
While this remains an important topic for further research, 
it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions on this issue 
based on the limited information currently available.
1.6 The user interface
Some research has explored the business models used 
by darknet drug vendors, and the relationships and 
interactions that exist between buyers and sellers. Bancroft 
and Reid (2015), for example, used discussions on a 
market forum and qualitative interviews to explore how 
drug quality is assessed by users and how experiences 
of purity, dosing, effects and vendors are systematically 
shared.
FIGURE 1.5
Example of an online anonymous marketplace: AlphaBay; (a) displays various drug listings and (b) shows a 
specific item listing
a) Overview of drug listings
b) Specific item listing
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Barratt and Maddox (2016) conducted an ethnographic 
study on the impact of Silk Road on drug use among those 
using Silk Road to buy drugs. Participants described a 
peak of drug consumption in the initial months of using 
Silk Road, with some reporting less hoarding of drugs due 
to more availability from darknet markets. Van Hout and 
Bingham (2014) explored vendors’ accounts of Silk Road 
and concluded that sellers often adopted a ‘professional’ 
approach or business model to ensure client loyalty and 
maximise profits over time, meaning attention to providing 
‘high-quality products’, follow-up communication and 
forum activity. Van Hout and Bingham (2013b), based on 
a single case study approach, explored the purchasing 
practices, experiences and motives of users of the initial 
Silk Road market and reported that the relationship 
between vendors and customers was often based on 
mutual trust. These findings highlight the importance of 
buyer feedback mechanisms to the functioning of darknet 
markets, as they allow potential buyers to assess the 
performance of vendors with other customers.
From a user interface standpoint, Figure 1.5 shows, as an 
example, the AlphaBay marketplace. Information available 
on AlphaBay is reasonably representative of what can 
typically be found on an online anonymous marketplace.
The main AlphaBay page, shown in Figure 1.5a, displays 
various categories of items available for sale, as 
represented on the left-hand menu, including ‘drugs’, 
that is, primarily illicit drugs, and prescription drugs, that 
is, medicines. As evidenced in the figure, different items 
may be sold by different vendors. Usually, the marketplace 
acts as a broker — similar to eBay (see box below) — that 
ensures that transactions are completed to the satisfaction 
of both buyers and sellers, while taking a percentage fee 
for each transaction. For example, information on AlphaBay 
indicates that the transaction fee is 4 % of the value of the 
sale. A fixed fee for smaller transactions has also been 
noted on the Hansa Market. Specific item listings, as shown 
in Figure 1.5b, contain numerous pieces of information: 
in the case of AlphaBay, an origin country (the United 
Kingdom), potential shipping destinations (Europe, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland), a vendor name (taken out), a 
description of the item and, crucially, user feedback.
Feedback and ratings mitigate the potential for being 
tricked by unscrupulous vendors, both on legitimate 
e-commerce sites and on darknet marketplaces. They 
provide buyers with a relatively reliable account of a 
vendor’s previous transactions and track record as well as 
the quality of individual products, and can help buyers to 
build an impression of whether or not the vendor can be 
trusted to supply a good-quality product.
Figure 1.6 gives an example of darknet marketplace 
feedback fields. On AlphaBay, feedback consists of a 
timestamp, a short comment, a rating (represented here 
by the green ‘+’ or red ‘–’ sign) and a four-character string 
allowing, to some extent, the possibility to differentiate 
buyers. This last field is not present on most markets. In the 
comments, several references to ‘stealth’ can be observed 
(underlined in Figure 1.6). The term ‘stealth’ is used to 
refer to how well the drugs have been concealed by the 
sender, which is likely to reduce the risk of detection and 
interception.
Darknet markets: an eBay for drugs?
Some have argued that darknet drug markets cannot 
be considered the ‘eBay for drugs’, as eBay is aimed at 
the retail level (RAND Europe, 2016). This is not strictly 
correct, however, as there are many examples of 
wholesale offers and ‘job lots’ for resellers available on 
eBay. In the 2016 RAND Europe study, which focused 
predominantly on the Netherlands, some exceptional 
wholesale-level transactions were noted (e.g. kilogram 
quantities of MDMA were listed); however, the vast 
majority of transactions were at the retail level. 
Despite this, 25 % of the revenue of Dutch vendors 
was from wholesale-level sales (those listings having 
a value of more than USD 1 000), which represented 
around 2 % of the overall transactions. In addition, the 
Netherlands was identified as the most active vendor 
country, per capita, with sales rates 2.4 times that of 
the United Kingdom and 4.5 times that of the United 
States. This is an interesting finding that merits further 
examination and scrutiny.
An important point is that darknet markets may flatten 
the often multilayered traditional drug-selling networks 
by providing producers and wholesale distributors 
with the opportunity to connect directly with 
consumers, which has been argued to be potentially 
more profitable from the vendor perspective, as it 
eliminates the need for intermediaries (Aldridge and 
Décary-Hétu, 2016). This question requires further 
investigation because, if it is true, it may represent an 
opportunity for law enforcement to tackle wholesale 
distribution.
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This feedback is particularly important for analysing the 
activity on darknet markets. As described by Christin 
(2013), mandatory feedback (which is the case for the 
majority of marketplaces) is a useful proxy for sales and 
can be used to explore market operations over time. Thus, 
data from mandatory feedback can be exploited to provide 
an idea of the sales volumes through a simple correlation 
between the feedback timestamps and the item prices 
(and the quantity, when available). For instance, the 
product for which feedback is presented in Figure 1.5 is 
sold for USD 79.99 (EUR 71.31) (3) (see Figure 1.5b); three 
pieces of feedback were deposited on 12 June 2017 (see 
Figure 1.6). It can then be inferred that the vendor sold 
USD 79.99 × 3 = USD 239.97 (EUR 213.93) worth of the 
item on that specific day.
(3) Currency conversions were carried out using the Currency Converter 
application at Statistical Data Warehouse, European Central Bank 
(available at https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/).
1.7 The impact of law 
enforcement
Vendors on darknet markets are no different from drug 
dealers in other marketplaces in their desire to avoid 
detection and minimise risk (Décary-Hétu et al., 2016; 
Murray, 2016). These risks include arrest and violence, and 
threat to profits and reputation. Different law enforcement 
activities have the potential to have an impact on these 
risks. Darknet markets provide a place to conduct an illicit 
business with a low risk of arrest and a low risk of violence. 
However, the interception of shipments risks reputation 
and profitability should sales fall because of bad ratings. 
The closure of darknet marketplaces has been shown to 
temporarily disrupt market activities (Soska and Christin, 
2015; Van Buskirk et al., 2017b). In addition, high-intensity 
border control of postal deliveries appears to have an 
impact on the willingness of vendors to ship goods to 
certain countries. A study of vendor practice also suggests 
that vendors based in countries where law enforcement 
is perceived as more effective are less likely to offer 
FIGURE 1.6
AlphaBay offered rich feedback information
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International shipping (Décary-Hétu et al., 2016; Kruithof et 
al., 2016).
The impact of robust border controls, such as the stringent 
and frequent control of parcels, has the potential to 
influence vendor behaviour, with some operational 
successes noted in several EU Member States (see 
Chapter 3). An example here is listings on the Hansa 
market, where some vendors will not ship to Finland, or 
they will not provide a refund or reship the item if the item 
is lost. In addition, robust border controls may also be 
associated with the existence of local darknet markets 
catering for national demand (see Section 2.2).
The relative magnitude of vendor sales on darknet 
marketplaces may also indicate another potential 
vulnerability to the impact of law enforcement interventions. 
Soska and Christin (2015) estimated that 1 % of vendors 
across several darknet markets were responsible for about 
50 % of transactions. While about half of the vendors sold 
one or more substances in one market echelon, vendors 
selling in multiple echelons tended to be ‘superstores’ 
carrying more than one drug type and having greater sales 
volumes. The absolute number of vendors based in the 
EU reported in this study (see Section 2.1) was 3 305. 
This suggests that targeting law enforcement efforts on 
the most active vendors has the potential to significantly 
reduce the supply of drugs to consumers in the EU and 
elsewhere.
2
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First, this chapter presents an 
EU-focused analysis of drug supply 
on global darknet marketplaces 
(2011-2015). It then looks into Europe’s 
own national online anonymous 
markets, identifying their spread and 
key features. The final section brings 
into focus the evolution of one of the 
largest online anonymous darknet 
markets — AlphaBay — accounting for 
its activity during (most of) its lifetime 
(2015-2017).
2.1 An EU-focused analysis 
of drug supply in the online 
anonymous marketplace 
ecosystem
Key methodological points
This section is based on data collected by Soska and 
Christin (2015). Tables 2.1 and 2.2 outline the data 
collected (late 2011 to early 2015) and the item categories 
analysed, respectively. A full report including all technical 
details can be found in a supporting online report, 
‘An EU-focused analysis of drug supply on the online 
anonymous marketplace ecosystem’ (4) , and in Soska 
and Christin (2015). The aim of the study was to better 
understand the extent of darknet drug sales originating 
from Europe. Regular snapshots were collected from 16 
(4) See: EU-focused analysis of drug supply on the online anonymous 
marketplace ecosystem, available at http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/
document-library/eu-focused-analysis-drug-supply-online-anonymous-
marketplace-ecosystem_en
major marketplaces during the period 22 November 2011 
to 16 February 2015. Based on an extrapolation of data 
from buyer feedback reports it was possible to estimate the 
volumes and values of drugs traded over time. Additional 
information, where it was available, was collected on 
shipping locations. While not exhaustive, this approach 
did allow an audit of the main marketplaces trading to 
European consumers over the study period.
TABLE 2.1
Markets crawled — which markets were crawled, 
the period the measurements span and the 
number of snapshots taken
Marketplace Measurement 
period
Number of 
snapshots
Agora (a) 28.12.13-12.06.15 161
Atlantis 07.02.13-21.09.13 52
Black Flag 19.10.13-28.10.13 9
Black Market 
Reloaded (a)
11.10.13-29.11.13 25
Tor Bazaar 02.07.14-15.10.14 27
Cloud 9 02.07.14-28.10.14 27
Deep Bay 19.10.13-29.11.13 24
Evolution (a) 02.07.14-16.02.15 43
Flo Market 02.12.13-05.01.14 23
Hydra (a) 01.07.14-28.10.14 29
The Marketplace 08.07.14-08.11.14 90
Pandora (a) 01.12.13-28.10.14 140
Sheep Marketplace 19.10.13-29.11.13 25
Silk Road (a)(b) 22.11.11-24.07.12 133
18.06.13-18.08.13 31
Silk Road 2.0 (a) 24.11.13-26.10.14 195
Utopia 06.02.14-10.02.14 10
Notes: 
(a)  Denotes markets analysed; because of incomplete (feedback) data and/or 
small volumes, the rest of the markets were excluded from the analysis.
(b)  The November 2011-July 2012 Silk Road data are from a previously reported 
collection effort, with publicly available data (Christin, 2013).
Source: Soska and Christin (2015).
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TABLE 2.2: DATA CATEGORIES
Drug categories of primary interest Other drugs Non-drugs
Cannabis: all forms of cannabis products 
(herb, resin, oil, seeds)
Opioids: heroin, opium, analgesics (e.g. 
oxycodone)
Cocaine: all forms of cocaine products
Synthetic stimulants: (meth)amphetamine, 
MDMA, MDA
Dissociatives: ketamine, GHB, GBL
Hallucinogens: LSD, PCP (excluding 
psychedelics)
NPS:
 Cannabinoids: synthetic cannabinoids 
including spice, K2
 Opioids: synthetic opioids including 
fentanils, MT-45
 Stimulants: mephedrone, 
4-fluoroamphetamine
 Dissociatives: MXE, DXM
 Hallucinogens: 25I-NBOMe, 4-AcO-
DMT, 2C-B
Prescription drugs: benzodiazepines, 
barbiturates, sildenafil and related products
Psychedelics: mushrooms and other
Steroids: steroid products
Drug paraphernalia: bongs, pipes, scales
Digital goods: all forms of digital goods 
including forgeries, credit card numbers, 
e-books
Electronics: electronic items and components  
Tobacco: tobacco products, including 
e-cigarettes
Weapons: all sorts of illegal firearms
Miscellaneous: miscellaneous items not 
categorised in any other category
Findings
Presented here are (1) an analysis of sales originating 
from the EU, Turkey and Norway, and a comparison with 
sales originating outside the region; (2) an analysis of the 
quantities sold; and (3) an analysis of vendor characteristics.
Sales from the European Union
There are 24 EU countries with darknet markets sales in 
at least one of the seven categories of drugs of primary 
interest (see Table 2.2). Analysis of the revenue and weight 
of the drug sales originating from these countries reveals a 
group of three main countries (see Figure 2.1). 
For the seven drug categories, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 
present a breakdown of sales originating from the EU, 
Norway and Turkey by country. Both of these figures are 
stacked plots. NPS are aggregated into a single category. 
Figure 2.2 shows the aggregate number of transactions 
over the entire data collection interval (22 November 2011-
16 February 2015). Caution is needed in interpreting these 
data in respect of the extrapolation of yearly revenues, 
given the considerable fluctuations in and instability of the 
whole ecosystem during that period (Soska and Christin, 
2015) and the data collection limitations (see online 
supporting material (5)).
(5) See: EU-focused analysis of drug supply on the online anonymous 
marketplace ecosystem, available at http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/
document-library/eu-focused-analysis-drug-supply-online-anonymous-
marketplace-ecosystem_en
FIGURE 2.1
Revenue and weight analysis of drug sales 
originating from the EU, Norway and Turkey 
by country, 2011-2015
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the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, stand out, in revenue 
and weight, from the remainder 
of the European countries
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FIGURE 2.2
Breakdown of sales revenues originating from the EU, Norway and Turkey by country, 2011-2015
a) Breakdown by revenue (major countries)
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(1) Multiple denotes where several EU countries are mentioned as country of origin.
Note: For readability, the three major countries (Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) are represented on a different scale.
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FIGURE 2.3
Breakdown of sales volumes (by weight) originating from the EU, Norway and Turkey by country, 2011-2015
a) Breakdown by volume (major countries)
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(1) Multiple denotes where several EU countries are mentioned as country of origin.
Note : For readability, the three major countries (Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) are represented on a different scale.
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Revenue analysis
The data presented in Figure 2.2 suggest that the vast 
majority of sales originating from the EU, during the 
22 November 2011-16 February 2015 period, originated 
from three countries: Germany, with about EUR 26.6 million 
in total sales for the seven drug categories of interest; 
the United Kingdom, with just over EUR 20.3 million in 
total sales; and the Netherlands, with just over EUR 17.9 
million in total sales. There is a large difference between 
the value of total sales in these three countries and the 
next highest sales values for Belgium (EUR 4.7 million), 
Croatia (EUR 2.3 million), Sweden (EUR 1.3 million), Spain 
(EUR 1.2 million) and the ‘others’, that is, those purporting to 
ship from multiple possible locations (EUR 1.1 million), with 
the rest all having less than EUR 1 million in total sales.
Among the top four countries, the most common 
substances sold by markets in Germany (EUR 14.5 million), 
the Netherlands (EUR 8.8 million) and Belgium 
(EUR 3.6 million) were non-cocaine stimulants, principally 
MDMA (ecstasy) and amphetamines. This is hardly 
surprising, since this region is an important global 
supplier of these synthetic drugs. In Germany and the 
Netherlands, cocaine and cannabis sales were also 
significant (EUR 5.6 million of cannabis sales for Germany 
and EUR 3.7 million for the Netherlands; EUR 4.2 million 
of cocaine sales for Germany and EUR 2.6 million for the 
Netherlands). In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, a 
more balanced picture can be seen with respect to the drug 
classes sold, with non-cocaine stimulants representing 
roughly EUR 5.6 million of all drugs sales, cannabis 
accounting for EUR 4.9 million and cocaine accounting 
for EUR 4.6 million. Vendors in the United Kingdom 
also appear to be far more likely to sell dissociatives 
(EUR 1.7 million) and NPS (EUR 852 000) than vendors in 
other countries.
Volume analysis
Figure 2.3 shows a similar breakdown, but this time by weight 
(in kg). The general trends observed with respect to financial 
revenue apply here as well: Germany (2 022 kg overall), 
United Kingdom (1 442 kg overall) and the Netherlands 
(1 375 kg overall) dominate the ecosystem. These are the 
only countries where the weights of products shipped 
exceeded, in aggregate, a metric tonne (i.e. 1 000 kg). 
Because of the vastly different prices per unit for the different 
categories of drugs, in this volumetric representation cocaine, 
opioids and hallucinogens represent a far smaller proportion 
than in the revenue representation in Figure 2.2; conversely, 
cannabis accounts for a significantly larger proportion. This is 
discussed in the section ‘Transaction amounts broken down 
by drug and by quantities sold’.
Comparison with non-EU sales
In Figure 2.4, the data presented show sales originating 
from the EU, Norway and Turkey in comparison with those 
originating from other countries, both for drugs in the 
seven categories of interest and for all products. Drug 
sales represent an overwhelming majority of the revenue 
of these marketplaces; this is more noticeable in the EU 
than in the rest of the world. This difference is due to digital 
goods usually being classified as having no specific origin, 
and these digital goods representing a non-negligible 
proportion of overall trade (Soska and Christin, 2015).
In terms of drug sales, EU countries represent roughly 
46.0 % of global drug revenue, but only 34.0 % of the 
weight sold. This is because cannabis, which has a lower 
unit cost than other substances, is responsible for a greater 
proportion of sales outside the EU than within the EU 
(Soska and Christin, 2015).
New psychoactive substances
The analysis indicates that NPS tend to represent only a 
very small proportion of all trade on online anonymous 
marketplaces. Where NPS were observed to be sold on 
FIGURE 2.4
Comparison of drug sales in the EU and the rest 
of the world, 2011-2015
EU countries represent roughly 46 % 
of global drug revenue...
... but only 34 % of drug weight
EU +2Rest of the world
EU +2Rest of the world
Drug weight
Drug 
revenue
€79 012 948€ 93 332 764
5.52 tonnes10.88 tonnes
Note: Drugs in the seven categories of interest.
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such marketplaces, they were usually despatched from the 
United Kingdom.
Figure 2.5 provides a finer-grained view of the sales of NPS 
on online anonymous marketplaces, over time, as a stacked 
plot. The data are subject to the same limitations as the 
data described in the original paper (Soska and Christin, 
2015). Thus, for example, data collection gaps exist in late 
2012 — when most markets were not active — and there 
are few data available for those that were active, such as 
Black Market Reloaded and the Sheep marketplace.
To improve clarity, all data points presented here represent 
averages over 30-day moving windows. Figure 2.5 shows 
that NPS sales volumes rarely amounted to more than 
EUR 3 000 per day during the study period. Interestingly, 
most of the NPS sold on online anonymous marketplaces in 
the time interval of our study were hallucinogens, whereas 
sales of synthetic cannabinoids, dissociatives, opioids and 
stimulants were almost negligible. The reasons for this are 
unclear, but may tie in with the availability of replacements 
for LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) at the time, that is, 
the NBOMe drugs known as ‘N-bombs’. These drugs are 
particularly dangerous (25I-NBOMe was subject to an 
EU-level risk assessment in 2014) and gave rise to the 
1960s peace campaign slogan ‘don’t drop bombs, drop 
acid’ among users, to try to discourage the use of such 
LSD replacements. Figure 2.4 confirms that the majority of 
NPS seem to originate from the United Kingdom; Germany, 
the Netherlands and Spain also contribute to the supply 
of NPS, albeit to a far lesser extent. The dotted line in 
Figure 2.5 corresponds to total NPS sales for all countries, 
including those not represented individually in the plot.
Variations in revenues follow the growth and decline of the 
overall online anonymous marketplace ecosystem. Caution 
is needed when interpreting the observed decreases 
in early 2015: these data represent the ecosystem 
immediately after Operation Onymous (see Section 3.3) 
and correspond to the end of the measurement interval. 
This means that they are statistically less reliable than the 
earlier data, for reasons related to the incomplete coverage 
of every single data scrape (for more detail, see Soska and 
Christin, 2015).
Transaction amounts broken down by drug 
and by quantities sold
This subsection looks at the transaction amounts broken 
down by drug and by the typical quantities sold.
Regarding cannabis, the majority of deals represent small 
quantities and only a small number of high-volume sales 
can be observed. As can be seen from Table 2.3, the 
most common unit of cannabis product sold is 5 g, with 
a mean price of EUR 58. The high standard deviation is 
explained by the fact that various products (oils, edibles, 
etc.) are also classified as cannabis, so there is quite a 
large price dispersion. There appears to be a modest 
volume-discounting effect for cannabis products. The most 
common unit of cocaine sold is 1 g, with a mean price of 
EUR 84. The volume-discounting effect is markedly more 
pronounced for cocaine than it is for cannabis products. 
Ketamine is the most prominent drug in the ‘dissociatives’ 
category. The most common unit sold is 1 g, with a mean 
price of EUR 40, and there does not appear to be much 
bulk discounting for ketamine.
It is difficult to provide unit prices for synthetic stimulants, 
as they include a variety of different types of drugs and 
the descriptive terms used are not always definitive 
(‘MDMA’, ‘ecstasy’, ‘speed’, ‘meth’, etc.). The wide range of 
substances falling under this category means that there is 
a corresponding wide range of prices for any given quantity. 
In addition, difficulties in interpretation are compounded by 
the fact that a number of sellers offer ‘lottery sales’, which 
involve a single item being sold at a heavily discounted price 
to multiple buyers, only one of whom will actually ‘win’ it.
FIGURE 2.5
Breakdown of daily NPS sales originating from 
the EU, Norway and Turkey
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TABLE 2.3
Prices of the most common units sold of cannabis products, cocaine and ketamine
Drug Total number of all items 
in this drug class 
Most common unit 
sold (g)
Number of items (and 
percentage) in most 
common weight category
Mean price (EUR) 
(standard deviation) 
Cannabis products 9 837 5  1 745 (17.7 %) 58 (± 39)
Cocaine 2 295 1  664 (28.9 %) 84 (± 30)
Ketamine 469 1  143 (30.5 %) 40 (± 18)
Despite these difficulties, it is possible to make some 
observations from the synthetic stimulant data. There 
appears to be limited bulk discounting for MDMA. As a 
group, the price for opioids varies considerably and modest 
volume discounting can be observed. LSD was the most 
common hallucinogen offered during the study period 
and there was a large variation in the price of retail doses 
(250 μg or less) for this drug, partly due to measurement 
errors at such low levels and partly due to vendors 
offering samples for (nearly) free or as part of lotteries. 
As the volume increases, the price increases somewhat 
linearly. Novel hallucinogens (e.g. NBOMe, DMT) account 
for the vast majority of NPS sales data in the database. 
Unsurprisingly, these display the same pattern as that 
observed for LSD, albeit in relation to considerably larger 
weights (gram as opposed to microgram quantities).
Vendor diversification
This subsection examines the range of products and the 
quantities that vendors offer. The analysis explores whether 
or not vendors sell products within a particular weight 
range, sell more than one drug type, and sell other products 
or services.
Diversification in terms of the volumes offered
To examine whether or not vendors who sell large 
quantities also sell small quantities, a coefficient of 
diversity was computed (see online supplementary 
report (6) ). The quantity tiers for each drug category are 
based on a three-tier distinction based on sales volumes 
in grams between retail level, middle-market level and 
wholesale at EU level (EMCDDA, 2016b) (Table 2.4).
An overwhelming (≈90 %) majority of cannabis vendors sell 
within one market tier, or echelon. A minority sell across two 
echelons; almost no vendor has significant sales across 
(6) See: EU-focused analysis of drug supply on the online anonymous 
marketplace ecosystem, available at http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/
document-library/eu-focused-analysis-drug-supply-online-anonymous-
marketplace-ecosystem_en
all three. It also appears quite rare for a vendor to sell both 
in bulk and small volumes at the same time, but some 
vendors selling relatively large quantities sometimes also 
offer ‘testing samples’ to their customers. Data on cocaine 
show a similar picture. In contrast, however, more diversity 
can be seen for hallucinogens, opioids and stimulants in 
particular, where, although most vendors are selling at the 
retail level, some vendors also sell across multiple echelons 
with a number of different drugs in each.
Vendors selling in multiple echelons tend to be what might 
be regarded as ‘superstores’, that is, they are more likely 
to offer more than one type of drug and to have relatively 
high sales volumes. Conversely, vendors who typically sell 
at only the retail level tend to specialise in one item and to 
have relatively low sales volumes.
Diversification in terms of the products offered
With regard to diversity across products, about half of all 
vendors specialise in one category. This is frequently the 
case for cannabis (566 vendors) and synthetic stimulants 
(422 vendors), which is not surprising given that they 
are frequently sold items. The other half displays more 
diversity. Typically, such vendors sell drugs from a couple of 
categories and a very small number of those vendors sell 
multiple substances. Those vendors usually sell at the retail 
level.
Of the 2 062 vendors reportedly shipping drugs in one of 
the seven categories of interest from the EU, 346 (16.8 %) 
also sell other types of drugs (e.g. prescription drugs) 
and, perhaps surprisingly, 897 (43.5 %) also sell non-drug 
products (mostly digital goods). Over a third (35.5 %) 
of those 897 vendors who also sell non-drug products 
sell drugs from only one category (primarily cannabis or 
synthetic stimulants); and just under a quarter (23.9 %) 
sell a range of drugs. Only five of the vendors selling 
non-drugs are ‘bulk’ vendors — three sell large amounts 
of hallucinogens, one sells opioids and one sells synthetic 
stimulants.
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Vendors selling under multiple aliases or on multiple 
marketplaces
The discussion of the analysis presented above assumes 
that every vendor account denotes a unique vendor. 
However, it is to be expected that a vendor would sell on 
more than one marketplace (Soska and Christin, 2015). 
From the 3 305 vendor accounts identified in Chapter 1, 
we attempted to identify which ones belong to the same 
person(s). These 3 305 vendor accounts in the EU are 
estimated to map to 2 180 unique entities, 1 271 of which 
sell drugs; 226 (17.8 %) of those sell at least two different 
types of drugs and 683 (53.7 %) sell drugs and also other 
products (e.g. digital goods).
2.2 National non-English-
language darknet markets
The above analysis of the stated origin countries shows 
the dominant position of English-speaking countries 
(the United Kingdom) and western European countries 
(Germany and the Netherlands) in darknet marketplaces. 
This is in line with other studies of darknet marketplaces 
(Kruithof et al., 2016; Broséus et al., 2017). This may reflect 
the central position of English-speaking parties in online 
darknet drug trade, which could deter non-English vendors 
(Kruithof et al., 2016). However, it may also be because 
less attention has been given to non-English-language or 
national sites. Currently, studies of non-English-speaking 
countries are very limited, but include a study of the Finnish 
version of Silk Road, Silkittie (Nurmi et al., 2017). Despite 
this, since 2013 several non-English-language markets 
have appeared (7). As noted previously, as many vendors 
appear to be reluctant to ship to countries with strict law 
enforcement and border controls, such as Finland (Kruithof 
et al., 2016); this may be one incentive for national markets 
to become established. To date, little is known about the 
extent to which national-based, non-English-language 
markets exist and what operational models they use. 
(7) Though not discussed here, it has been noted that machine-translated 
versions of several global marketplaces have also appeared, e.g. Wall 
Street Market and T•chka.
There is therefore a need to invest in work to better identify 
and describe darknet markets in order to target specific 
countries or languages. A preliminary analysis of this topic 
is provided here.
Key methodological points
This section of the report is based on data collected by 
the EMCDDA on a subcategory of darknet marketplaces 
— those with limited geographical scope of operation, 
catering for the non-English-speaking buyers in a particular 
place. Data were sourced in May 2017 through a short 
survey distributed among the 28 EU Member States, 
Turkey, Norway and the neighbouring countries (IPA: n = 6; 
ENP: n = 7) (8) (see Annex 1 for the questions in this survey 
and instructions for completion). In addition, in June 2017, 
two surface websites (9) were searched for non-English 
darknet markets, and information was gathered from the 
darknet markets identified.
The prices of a range of drug types sold on national darknet 
markets were collected from a number of platforms, with 
mean prices based on several samples (between two and 
eight) taken in June 2017.
Findings
Two thirds (n = 29) of the countries approached responded 
to the data request. Of these, four countries reported a 
total of nine national darknet marketplaces — France 
(n = 5), Finland (n = 2), Sweden (n = 1) and Norway (n = 1). 
Additional searching identified a further four French-, three 
Italian- and four Russian-language (selling exclusively to 
the Russian market) darknet marketplaces — thus bringing 
the total to 20 national marketplaces across six countries.
(8) IPA (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance) countries: Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo*, 
Montenegro and Serbia; ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) partner 
countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, Moldova, Morocco and 
Ukraine.
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in 
line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of 
independence.
(9) https://darknetmarkets.org/markets/; https://www.deepdotweb.com/
marketplace-directory/categories/non-english/
TABLE 2.4
Quantity tiers for selected drugs of interest
Drug type/
market level
Cannabis (g) Opioids (g) Stimulants (MDMA 
tablets) (g)
Hallucinogens (g)
Retail < 100 < 1 < 10 (< 50) < 8
Middle-market 100-999 1-999 10-999 (> 50-999) 8-159
Wholesale ≥ 1 000 ≥ 1 000 ≥ 1 000 ≥ 160
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Of these, seven French, one Italian and one Russian 
marketplace appeared, at least temporarily, to be closed or 
unavailable when accessed. The Norwegian market never 
actualised any sales and a further three sites were noted to 
be forums rather than marketplaces (Table 2.5).
At the time of writing, there appeared to be seven active 
national darknet marketplaces, as outlined in Table 2.6).
All seven darknet marketplaces catering for specific 
countries, or run in a language other than English for 
the global market, appear to sell drugs over Tor, with the 
majority offering open registration (with the exception of 
La main noire, which is accessible by invitation only) and 
some form of escrow functionality (except Sipulikanava 
and Flugsvamp 2.0). In just two instances, the creation 
date of the reported platform was known (Flugsvamp 2.0: 
April 2015; Silkkitie: January 2014).
While different factors may contribute to the emergence 
and endurance of these national/local platforms, it would 
appear that law enforcement activity may play a significant 
role. As noted above, some vendors will not (re)ship to 
Finland (see Figure 2.6a) and some Finnish vendors will 
ship only nationally (see Figure 2.6b).
In terms of geographical scope, while in most cases it was 
made apparent that the marketplace served the needs 
of a national drug market (e.g. Russian Hydra sellers 
all appeared to be Russia based, shipping to over 100 
locations across the country), there were instances where 
the marketplace was run in a non-English language, for 
example the Italian IDC 2.0 market, even though sellers 
were not necessarily based in Italy and were reportedly 
shipping ‘worldwide’ (see Figure 2.7).
TABLE 2.5
Excluded national marketplaces — overview
Country/language Platform name Source Reason for exclusion
France/French The French connection Survey (Temporarily) closed (2 June 2017)
France/French French Deep Web Survey; Deepdotweb.com (Temporarily) closed (2 June 2017)
France/French French Freedom Zone Survey; Deepdotweb.com (Temporarily) closed (2 June 2017)
France/French THC Market Deepdotweb.com Unavailable (20 June 2017)
France/French French Darknet Deepdotweb.com Unavailable (20 June 2017); possibly hacked
France/French French Market Place darknetmarkets.org Unavailable (20 June 2017)
France/French French Dark Place 2.0 darknetmarkets.org Unavailable (20 June 2017)
Italy/Italian Babylon darknetmarkets.org Unavailable (20 June 2017)
Italy/Italian Italian darknet Community Deepdotweb.com; darknetmarkets.org Forum 
Norway/Norwegian Fluesopp Survey Never had actual sales (as of 2 June 2017)
Russia/Russian Wayaway Deepdotweb.com Unavailable (20 June 2017)
Russia/Russian Rutor Deepdotweb.com Forum
Russia/Russian Ramp Deepdotweb.com Forum
TABLE 2.6
Active darknet marketplaces for specific countries/languages
Country/language Platform name and URL Source
France/French La main noire Survey
France/French Le bon coin Survey; Deepdotweb.com
Finland/Finnish Sipulikanava Survey 
Finland/Finnish Silkkitie Survey; deepdotweb.com; darknetmarkets.org
Sweden/Swedish Flugsvamp 2.0 Survey
Italy/Italian IDC 2.0 market Deepdotweb.com
Russia/Russian Hydra Deepdotweb.com
40
Drugs and the darknet: Perspectives for enforcement, research and policy
FIGURE 2.6
Examples from the Hansa market of Finland-related vendors’ activity
a) Vendors state, in their terms of service, ‘no (re)shipping to. . . Finland’ among other countries
b) Finland-based vendor declares shipping to Finland only
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FIGURE 2.7
The Italian IDC 2.0 market’s Spain-based vendor ships ‘worldwide’
At the time of reporting, all seven darknet marketplaces 
had limited commercial activity. For example, only 30 
drug products were displayed on the French marketplace 
Le bon coin and a comparable number of illicit drugs 
and medicinal products across 10 drug categories were 
available on the Russian marketplace Hydra.
The average retail prices of cannabis resin, MDMA and LSD 
were lowest on the Italian IDC 2.0 market and highest on 
the Russian Hydra market. Herbal cannabis and cocaine 
appeared cheapest on the Swedish Flugsvamp 2.0 market 
(herbal cannabis, EUR 10/g; cocaine, around EUR 70/g) 
and most expensive on the Finnish darknet markets 
(herbal cannabis, EUR 20/g) and the Russian Hydra market 
(cocaine, EUR 180/g) (Table 2.7).
When trying to compare darknet market prices with 
conventional ‘street’ market prices reported to EMCDDA, no 
meaningful pattern emerged; a larger dataset would need 
to be compiled to permit such comparative analysis.
Since drug prices were not collected systematically, the 
values in Table 2.7 should be seen as a rough guide to 
what some of the main drug types cost on national darknet 
platforms. At the time of data gathering, key drugs such 
as heroin were unavailable on some markets, limiting the 
analysis. Nonetheless, an important observation is that 
drug prices on the Russian darknet market are consistently 
higher than on European darknet markets, particularly 
the Italian IDC 2.0 market, possibly reflecting the greater 
distance of Russia-based vendors from countries perceived 
to be associated with the production of drugs.
2.3 Case study: AlphaBay
Key methodological points
In the previous sections of this report, a market-level 
analysis of darknet activities has been provided based on 
a review of the major markets that were known to exist 
during the study period. Here we complement this with 
a more detailed case study of one of the most important 
marketplaces (in terms of lifespan, sales volume and 
customer database), AlphaBay. This section reviews in 
detail the activities of the AlphaBay darknet marketplace 
throughout most of its existence (from March 2015 to 
May 2017; AlphaBay was shut down in July 2017 by law 
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enforcement) and applies the same methodology used for 
the EU-focused analysis of the whole online anonymous 
marketplace ecosystem (see Section 2.1 and online 
supporting report (10)).
The AlphaBay marketplace
The AlphaBay marketplace was reportedly designed in 
mid-2014 (11). It went online on 26 December 2014, shortly 
after Operation Onymous took place (see Figure 1.2). 
Similar to the Evolution marketplace, AlphaBay was 
reportedly started by ‘carders’, that is, people who had 
been trading stolen credit card numbers and other banking 
credentials. However, AlphaBay quickly began offering 
illicit drugs as well. Initially, it existed as a fairly small 
marketplace, overshadowed by Evolution and Agora. By 
mid-2015, however, following the closure of Evolution, 
AlphaBay started to gain exposure and reportedly became 
one of the leading markets later that year and, by 2016, it 
was almost certainly the most prominent operator in the 
cryptomarket space. Below is a historical analysis of how 
this progression happened.
Findings
Evolution of sales on AlphaBay
The evolution of sales on AlphaBay over time is shown in 
Figure 2.8 for most of its operating history. Each (stacked) 
curve represents a specific country or set of countries.
(10) See: EU-focused analysis of drug supply on the AlphaBay darknet market 
for the full duration of its operation, available at http://www.emcdda.
europa.eu/document-library/eu-focused-analysis-drug-supply-alphabay-
marketplace_en
(11) United States of America vs. Alexandre Cazes, June 2017. United States 
District Court, Eastern District of (California. Indictment 1:17CR-0144-
LJO-SKO.
Figure 2.8a represents the evolution of sales in absolute 
value, over time, presented in euros, as a 28-day moving 
average. The discrepancy between the total value of sales 
and the sum of all sales from countries that could be 
identified is due partially to incomplete coverage.
Overall, it appears that AlphaBay gained considerable 
popularity towards the end of 2015, and then more or less 
continued its steady climb until its demise. The apparent 
decline, at the end of the collection interval, is likely to be 
an artefact due to imperfect coverage. For earlier scrapes, 
incomplete data could be recovered in subsequent scrapes. 
After the closure of the market, such data recovery was not 
possible, resulting in a likely underestimate for the final data 
collection period. It can be seen that by early 2017 AlphaBay 
had reached a peak of over EUR 600 000 per day — this is 
about twice as much as the value of the original Silk Road 
sales during its peak in the summer of 2013 (Soska and 
Christin, 2015). Figure 2.8b shows the same information, 
expressed as a fraction of total sales. It can be seen that all 
EU trade is roughly a quarter of all the total trade that could 
be identified, and that this remained fairly constant over time.
Categories over time
In terms of overall sales volumes, broken down by product 
categories, Figure 2.9 shows that AlphaBay started as a 
primarily digital goods business, but then gradually began 
to trade more and more in illicit drugs when the (then-
leading) Evolution marketplace went down in March 2015. 
Following the Agora marketplace shutdown in August 
2015, the increase in transactions on AlphaBay became 
even more pronounced. By mid-2017, cannabis and 
stimulants (cocaine and synthetic substances) represented 
approximately two thirds of all trade on this marketplace.
TABLE 2.7
Average prices (EUR) per drug unit (g/tablet/blotter); examples from five national darknet markets
Drug type/
market (country)
IDC 2.0 (Italy) Flugsvamp 2.0 (Sweden) Sipulikanava (Finland) Silkkitie (Finland) Hydra (Russia)
Price (EUR) (± SD) per drug unit (g/tablet/blotter)
Herbal cannabis 11.7 (± 2.3) 10.3 20.0 20.0 17.2 (± 4.7)
Cannabis resin 7.7 (± 3.3) 8.2 NA NA 13.6 (± 3.4)
Heroin NA 102.8 NA NA 64.5 (± 18.6)
Cocaine 85.8 (± 9.7) 72.0 140.0 150.0 180.0 (± 28.0)
Amphetamine 9.3 (± 5.5) 10.3 40.0 30.0 11.8 (± 3.8)
MDMA 5.2 (± 0.2) 6.2 NA 12.0 13.2 (± 4.0)
LSD 11.0 (± 4.7) 17.1 NA NA 23.4 (± 4.5)
NA, not available, i.e. no listings at the time; SD, standard deviation (not available for prices reported for the Swedish and Finnish markets).
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Sales from the European Union
This part of the analysis looks solely at drugs (in the seven 
categories of primary interest; see Section 3.2, Table 2.2) 
originating from the EU, Norway and Turkey.
There were 24 EU countries with AlphaBay sales in at least 
one of the seven categories of drugs of primary interest 
(see Table 2.2). Analysis of the revenue and weight of the 
drug sales originating from these countries revealed a 
group of three main countries (see Figure 2.10).
Revenue analysis
As was the case for the marketplace ecosystem as a whole 
between 2011 and 2015 (Section 2.1), Figure 2.11 shows 
that the vast majority of sales originating from the EU come 
from the same three countries: the United Kingdom, with 
approximately EUR 19.7 million of total sales for the seven 
drug categories of interest between March 2015 and May 
2017; Germany, with sales of EUR 12.1 million; and the 
Netherlands, with sales of EUR 10.6 million. France, with 
sales of EUR 2.0 million, is the only other country that had 
FIGURE 2.8
Evolution of sales on AlphaBay over time by country, 2015-2017
a) Total sales over time EUR (per country breakdown)      b) Relative sales over time (per country breakdown)
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a) Total sales over time EUR (per country breakdown) b) Relative sales over time (per country breakdown)
Notes: The left-hand plot (a) represents a breakdown per country. The grey line shows the total value of sales. The white area represents sales for which there is a 
record, but for which no corresponding item listing could be recovered, thus preventing country inference. The grey area shows non-EU sales. The right-hand plot (b) 
presents the same information, on a relative scale, excluding items for which the corresponding listing is missing.
(1) There were no sales identifiable from feedback occurring on 31 August 2015, as AlphaBay was down for significant parts of the day. There was evidence that some 
sales had taken place; however, no country or category could be identified because there was no direct feedback attached to them. As a result, Figure 2.8a displays no 
data for 31 August 2015. For Figure 2.8b the missing data points were removed before computing the moving 28-day averages, resulting in a continuous plot.
FIGURE 2.9
Evolution of sales on AlphaBay over time by category, 2015-2017
a) Total sales over time EUR (per category breakdown)     b) Relative sales over time (per category breakdown)
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Notes: The grey line in (a) is the total value of sales. The white area represents sales for which there is a record, but the corresponding item listing could not be recov-
ered, thus preventing category inference. The right-hand plot (b) presents the same information, but on a relative scale (excluding items for which the corresponding 
listing is missing).
(1) There were no sales identifiable from feedback occurring on 31 August 2015, as AlphaBay was down for significant parts of the day. There was evidence that some 
sales had taken place; however, no country or category could be identified because there was no direct feedback attached to them. As a result, Figure 2.9a displays no 
data for 31 August 2015. For Figure 2.9b the missing data points were removed before computing the moving 28-day averages, resulting in a continuous plot.
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a gross revenue of more than EUR 1 million between 2015 
and 2017.
The analysis of the whole darknet ecosystem identified 
that the top three countries primarily sold stimulants 
other than cocaine (Section 2.1, Figures 2.2 and 2.3). The 
situation with regard to AlphaBay appears slightly different, 
with revenues more evenly distributed between cannabis, 
cocaine and other stimulants; and with a second tier 
(opioids, hallucinogens and dissociatives) also fairly evenly 
distributed. The Netherlands appears to sell significantly 
less cannabis than other countries and, proportionally, 
more cocaine and stimulants. France, the fourth country 
on the list, seems to generate a relatively high amount 
of revenue from opioids. Overall, the value of NPS sales 
remains quite small (in the order of EUR 100 000-
EUR 300 000 for the leading countries); however, it is 
possible that some novel opioids that could be classified as 
NPS are instead classified under the general term opioids.
Volume analysis
Figure 2.12 shows a breakdown by weight (kg) of drugs 
sold. The results are generally consistent with those of 
Figure 2.10: Germany (2 130 kg overall), the Netherlands 
(1 392 kg overall) and the United Kingdom (1 352 kg overall) 
dominate; these are the only countries where the weight 
of products shipped exceeds, in aggregate, a metric tonne. 
Interestingly, the United Kingdom generates more revenue 
per volume of drug sold than other countries. In particular, 
the volume of stimulants from the United Kingdom is much 
smaller than the volume from Germany and the Netherlands, 
yet the revenue is only slightly less. A manual inspection of 
results reveals that, while Germany and the Netherlands 
primarily focus on sales of MDMA/ecstasy tablets, the 
United Kingdom tends to sell more stimulants such as 
methylphenidate, amphetamine and dextroamphetamine, 
the individual unit sizes sold of which are much smaller than 
those of MDMA and ecstasy, but are a similar price.
Comparison with non-EU sales
Figure 2.13 compares sales originating from the EU (plus 
Norway and Turkey) with those originating from other 
countries, both for the drugs in the seven categories of 
interest and for all products. The first observation is that 
drug sales on AlphaBay constituted an overwhelming 
majority (> 90.0 %) of all sales originating from the EU 
during this period. This is less so for sales originating from 
the rest of the world (76.0 %), which makes sense for 
reasons related to the origin of digital goods, as noted in 
Section 2.1.
EU countries accounted for 28.4 % of all revenue and 24.4 % 
of all volumes sold on AlphaBay between 2015 and 2017.
New psychoactive substances
In an effort to compare data from AlphaBay with those 
from older marketplaces, this section focuses on NPS. 
The data presented in Figure 2.5 (Section 2.1) show that 
NPS accounted for a very small fraction of all drug traffic 
on online anonymous marketplaces — probably less than 
EUR 3 000/day — during the period examined (2011-2015).
Figure 2.14 provides a finer-grained view of the sales of 
NPS specifically on AlphaBay, over time, as a stacked plot. 
It can be seen that NPS sales have remained modest, and 
are in line with that observed for the 2011-2015 interval 
(Figure 2.5, Section 2.1). Most NPS originate primarily from 
the United Kingdom and Germany, with the Netherlands a 
distant third. It is emphasised again that many NPS opioids 
(e.g. fentanyl derivatives) may in fact be labelled as opioids 
by the classifier, rather than as NPS, which could result in an 
underestimation of NPS sales. Most NPS sold on AlphaBay 
(and classified as such) appeared to be hallucinogens.
FIGURE 2.10
Revenue and weight analysis of AlphaBay drug 
sales originating from the EU, Norway and Turkey 
by country, 2015-2017
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United Kingdom, stand out, 
in revenue and weight, from the 
remainder of the European countries
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FIGURE 2.11
Breakdown of AlphaBay sales revenue originating from the EU, Norway and Turkey by country, 2015-2017 
a) Breakdown by revenue (major countries)
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Note: For readability, the three major countries (the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands) are represented on a different scale.
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FIGURE 2.12
Breakdown of AlphaBay sales volumes originating from the EU, Norway and Turkey by country, 2015-2017
a) Breakdown by volume (major countries)
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Note: For readability, the three major countries (Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) are represented on a different scale.
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Transaction amounts broken down by drug 
and by quantities sold
This section looks at the transaction amounts broken 
down by drug and by typical quantities sold, along with an 
indication of how things compare with the findings on the 
darknet ecosystem as a whole over the 2011-2015 period.
With regard to cannabis, the majority of sales were of small 
quantities, with only a small number of high-volume sales 
observed. Table 2.8 provides information about the most 
common units of cannabis product, cocaine and ketamine. 
For all these drugs, the most common unit sold is 1 g. There 
appears to be a modest volume-discounting effect.
The results closely mirror those of the findings reported in 
Section 2.1. The high standard deviations can be explained 
by the large dispersion due to a range of different products 
(oils, edibles, etc.) being classified as cannabis.
Drug sales across the different market levels
Figure 2.15 shows that, for cannabis and cocaine, most 
transactions occur at the retail level, and retail-level 
transactions account for the greatest proportion of all 
revenue. In contrast, for opioids and MDMA a greater 
proportion of transactions occur at the middle-market level. 
Importantly, for these two drugs the revenues generated at 
the middle-market level are higher than those generated 
as a result of retail transactions. For MDMA and opioids, 
therefore, darknet sales appear to be associated with 
supply for secondary distribution more than is the case for 
TABLE 2.8
Prices of the most common units sold on AlphaBay: cannabis products, cocaine and ketamine
Drug Total number of all items 
for this drug class
Most common unit sold 
(g)
Number of items and 
percentage of items in 
this weight category
Mean price (EUR) 
(standard deviation)
Cannabis products
1 1 239 (15.0 %) 12 (± 20)
8 244 5 976 (11.8 %) 49 (± 28)
10 910 (11.0 %) 86 (± 204)
Cocaine 2 546 1 626 (24.6 %) 68 (± 22) 
Ketamine 709 1 158 (22.3 %) 30 (± 13)
FIGURE 2.14
Breakdown of AlphaBay NPS sales originating 
from the EU, Norway and Turkey
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FIGURE 2.13
Comparison of drug sales and other AlphaBay 
sales in the EU and the rest of the world, 
2015-2017
EU countries represented 28.4 % of all drug 
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cannabis and cocaine. This assumes however that high-
volume purchases are more likely to be sold on rather than 
stored for personal use over time. Middle-market purchases 
of MDMA were defined, for the purposes of this study, as 
purchases of between 10 g and 1 kg (or 50-1 000 tablets). 
While it is possible that purchases of this magnitude would 
be for personal use, it is likely that a significant proportion 
of these purchases will be intended for secondary supply or 
could represent a group-purchasing approach. This finding 
requires further investigation, as it may be associated with 
a number of factors. Europe is a major producer of MDMA, 
and this may be important here. Alternatively the MDMA 
supply market may be structured in ways that make online 
sales more attractive. With respect to average drug prices 
across the different market levels, these data show that 
any discounting that may occur is likely to be for sales 
at the middle-wholesale level. The figures for opioids 
are more difficult to interpret because of the different 
substances included in this category and the relatively low 
cut-off volume used to define middle-level sales (1 g). No 
wholesale opioid transactions were detected; however, two 
large-volume sales of opioid cutting agents are apparent.
Vendor diversification
Diversification in terms of the volumes offered
The results for the diversification of vendors in terms of 
the volumes offered are nearly identical to those reported 
in Section 2.1. That is, an overwhelming (≈90 %) majority 
of cannabis vendors sell within only one volume tier (for 
drug-quantity tier definitions, see Section 2.1, Table 2.4). 
The rest of the vendors’ sales are more spread out across 
the volume tiers, but, in general, sales by a single vendor 
appear to be confined to no more than two tiers. In other 
words, most vendors stay within a single volume tier, a 
minority of vendors sell across two tiers, and almost no 
vendor has meaningful sales across three tiers. It is quite 
rare for a vendor to sell both bulk-sized quantities and 
small volumes at the same time, but some vendors selling 
larger quantities sometimes also offer ‘testing samples’ to 
their customers. More diversity among opioid and cocaine 
vendors is apparent in this analysis than was apparent in 
the entire ecosystem analysis for 2011-2015 (Section 2.1). 
In particular, a number of sellers sell across more than 
one tier, some giving out free (or cheap) samples, and 
some also sell in much larger quantities. As in the earlier 
analysis (Section 2.1), most diversity is apparent for 
stimulants other than cocaine, with most vendors sticking 
to the retail tier, but some vendors selling across multiple 
tiers with a number of items in each tier. This can be 
explained by the ease of stealthily shipping fairly large 
quantities of stimulant tablets. Likewise, the diversification 
of hallucinogen sales in terms of the volumes offered by 
vendors is almost the same as that reported in Section 2.1.
Vendors selling in multiple echelons tend to be 
‘superstores’ — they carry more than one type of drug and 
are also are more likely to sell higher volumes. In contrast, 
vendors who stick to one echelon (typically the lowest 
one) tend to specialise in one item, and to have relatively 
low sales volumes. In other words, vendor behaviour on 
AlphaBay during the 2015-2017 period, overall, was not 
much different from vendor behaviour in 2011-2015, based 
on previous measurements of the entire ecosystem (see 
Section 2.1).
Diversification in terms of the products offered
In all, 1 956 AlphaBay vendors reportedly shipped from 
the EU. With regard to the diversity of the products being 
sold, approximately half of these vendors specialise 
in one category only — this is frequently the case for 
cannabis (329 vendors) and stimulants other than cocaine 
(225 vendors), which is unsurprising given that those 
are very frequently sold items. On the other hand, only 
59 vendors specialise in opioids only. The other half of 
vendors are far more diverse, and typically those vendors 
sell drugs from a couple of categories. For instance, 
vendors selling dissociatives, hallucinogens or NPS rarely 
sell from only these categories. A very small number of 
vendors sell drugs from all categories, typically individual or 
small doses only.
Of the 1 956 EU vendors, 1 321 sell drugs from one of the 
seven categories of interest. Of those, 171 (13.0 %) also 
sell other types of drugs (e.g. prescription drugs); and 464 
(35.1 %) also sell non-drug products (e.g. digital goods). 
This diversity is consistent and comparable to previous 
findings (see Section 2.1). Of the 464 vendors selling drug 
and non-drug items, 133 (28.7 %) are confined to one drug 
category (primarily cannabis and stimulants other than 
cocaine); and 93 (20.0 %), on the other hand, are more 
diverse with regard to the types of products sold, selling 
multiple drugs along with non-drug products.
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CHAPTER 3 
Law enforcement perspectives
This chapter reviews online anonymous 
markets from an operational law 
enforcement perspective, elaborating on 
the challenges but also successful recent 
action — thus informing the discussion 
on future interventions in this area.
3.1 The threat
The darknet has emerged as a key platform to offer all types 
of illicit goods and services. Difficult to police yet easy to 
access, the darknet provides an ideal environment for the 
distribution of all types of illicit commodities including drugs, 
firearms, counterfeit goods and fraudulent documents. The 
number of goods on offer and the frequency with which new 
products become available indicates that the darknet trade 
in illicit goods is thriving and highly dynamic. Europol‘s 2017 
Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 
identified the online trade in illicit goods and services as one 
of the engines of organised crime, which continues to drive 
organised crime forward (Europol, 2017a). The online trade 
in illicit goods and services increasingly shapes business 
models and dictates the way in which successful OCGs 
operate.
The trade in illicit drugs is the mainstay of most major 
darknet markets. The majority of activity on darknet markets 
is drug related (see Figures 1.1 and 2.9). Research suggests 
that the total monthly illicit drugs revenue of the top eight 
darknet markets ranges between EUR 10.6 million and 
EUR 18.7 million (RAND Europe, 2016). It is estimated 
that the top 1 % most successful vendors are responsible 
for 51.5 % of all transactions on darknet markets (Soska 
and Christin, 2015). While it is assessed that the majority 
of vendors are lone offenders, dealing in small amounts, 
it is assessed that many of the ‘top sellers’ are likely to 
be OCGs earning significant profits. Law enforcement 
authorities across the EU have noted a significant increase 
in the number of cases involving the trade in illicit drugs 
on darknet markets over the last four years. The proportion 
of illicit drugs traded online remains small compared with 
the proportion traded through traditional distribution and 
trafficking networks, and it remains to be seen whether this 
new channel of supply will supplement or otherwise affect 
drug demand. Law enforcement authorities expect this 
phenomenon to continue and online markets to expand and, 
in some case, possibly even replace the use of traditional 
distribution networks by some user demographics.
While it is recognised that the scope of drug trade on the 
darknet is expanding and that darknet markets have the 
potential to displace (segments of) existing traditional drug 
markets in the EU, the overall interplay and relationship 
between the drugs trade via darknet markets and the 
traditional ‘offline’ drugs trade is still poorly understood by 
law enforcement authorities.
Finnish customs uncover major online 
drug network
In August 2016, the Finnish Customs Board 
dismantled a network involved in the trafficking and 
distribution of illicit drugs on the darknet. The network 
had emerged as the largest darknet vendor on the 
Nordic market. Finnish customs suspects that this 
network may have imported up to 40 000 ecstasy 
tablets, 30 000 LSD blotters and 40 kg of other drugs 
including amphetamine, methamphetamine, heroin, 
cocaine, MDMA, alpha-PVP and MDPV into the 
country.
The vendor profile had been in operation since 2014 
on the Silk Road market on the darknet.
Source: Yle Uutiset (2016).
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A polydrug trade paradise
All types of illicit drugs consumed in the EU are traded on 
darknet markets. The drugs trade, online and offline, is 
highly polycriminal. In terms of traditional drug trafficking, 
more than 75 % of the OCGs involved in the trafficking of 
one drug also traffic and distribute other types of drugs. 
Around 65 % of the OCGs involved in the drug trade are 
simultaneously involved in other criminal activities such as 
the trade in counterfeit goods, trafficking in human beings 
(THB) and migrant smuggling.
Darknet markets are tailor-made polycriminal 
environments. While some markets specialise in specific 
or niche commodities, the largest and most successful 
darknet markets either offer all types of illicit commodities 
or restrict themselves to distributing all types of illicit drugs.
The variety of illicit drugs on offer on darknet markets 
significant and greatly exceeds that available to individual 
users through street distribution.
Investigations into vendors operating on darknet markets 
have revealed a significant polycriminal element to the 
trade in illicit commodities on the darknet. Some vendors 
dealing in drugs have also been found to be involved in 
the trade in illegal firearms, payment fraud and cyber-
dependent crimes (offences that can be committed only 
using a computer, computer networks or other forms of 
information and communications technology) such as 
selling malware solutions or other toolkits. Many of these 
criminals or criminal groups operate using a crime-as-a-
service business model. This model mirrors the business-
to-business approach in the licit economy. Criminals 
primarily, or in some cases exclusively, provide criminal 
services, such as toolkits used for fraud or cyber-dependent 
crimes, to other, less sophisticated criminals. This model 
has also seen the proliferation of subscription-based 
models, which allow criminals to ‘rent’ cybercrime tools for 
a limited period, making these tools more affordable.
Many vendors offering illicit drugs on darknet markets 
operate polydrug businesses. While vendors of cannabis 
products largely confine themselves to distributing 
cannabis products, vendors selling other substances, such 
as cocaine or opioids, frequently offer different types of 
illicit drugs. This is particularly highlighted by the AlphaBay 
case study (Chapter 2, Section 2.3).
Perhaps like no other substances, despite the 
comparatively low volumes traded, NPS in particular have 
been associated with the expanding variety of substances 
offered on darknet markets. In some Member States, NPS 
are now almost exclusively distributed online. Prior to 
their prohibition, NPS are distributed on platforms on the 
surface web. However, once an NPS becomes a controlled 
substance under EU legislation, their distribution moves to 
darknet markets. The trade in NPS on darknet markets is 
expected to further expand, increasing the availability of all 
types of NPS over the coming years.
Law enforcement authorities have noted an increase 
in the availability of cannabis, both resin and herbal, on 
darknet markets over the last four years. In addition to their 
availability on surface web platforms, cannabis seeds are 
also offered widely on darknet marketplaces.
Wholesale distribution?
The analysis of data from darknet markets taken down by 
law enforcement authorities, such as Silk Road 2.0 and 
others, reveals the extent of trading activity, including 
information on the geographical location of vendors, if 
provided, and the number of transactions, the nature of the 
goods sold and the amounts paid. However, some trading, 
Darknet drugs and arms vendor arrested 
by Slovak authorities
In May 2017, Europol supported Slovak law 
enforcement authorities in their investigation into 
a Slovak national who had been trading firearms, 
ammunition and drugs on the darknet.
In one of the locations searched, Slovak authorities 
discovered and seized five firearms and approximately 
600 rounds of ammunition of different calibres. 
The investigators also found a sophisticated indoor 
cannabis plantation, 58 cannabis plants and a bitcoin 
wallet containing bitcoin worth EUR 203 000, which 
is thought to have been obtained from illicit online 
activities.
In addition, Slovak authorities and Europol dismantled 
an online drugs marketplace that was hidden on 
the darknet and which the individual arrested had 
been running as an administrator and operator since 
2015. At least 10 kg of cannabis had been purchased 
through this channel.
In addition to darknet trading in both firearms 
and drugs, firearms are sometimes used by those 
involved in the drug market and, unsurprisingly, there 
are reports of drugs and firearms being smuggled 
together (Europol, 2017b).
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especially the trading of wholesale quantities, is believed 
to be conducted via private messages after initial contact 
has been established between vendors and customers in 
response to darknet market listings. These messages are 
typically encrypted and require significant effort to decrypt. 
Even in the cases where encryption can be overcome, law 
enforcement authorities face additional challenges in the 
analysis of the communications data.
As already noted in Section 2.3, the wholesale of different 
drugs on darknet markets via listings appears to be 
limited; most transactions involve smaller quantities for 
individual use by consumers. However, repeated sales 
by individual vendors suggests that they have access to 
larger quantities of illicit drugs to sustain their businesses 
and meet customer demands. In many cases, it is unclear 
where these vendors obtain their supply, although they 
probably interact and trade with established OCGs involved 
in the traditional wholesale trafficking of illicit drugs. The 
nature of the links and the engagement between vendors 
on the darknet and ‘traditional’ drug traffickers remains a 
significant knowledge gap.
Vendors: individual criminals 
and organised crime groups
Darknet markets are dynamic environments with a 
significant number of vendors entering and leaving 
markets based on the availability of their stock and profit 
opportunities. Initially, most vendors on darknet markets 
were individual sellers, distributing limited amounts of 
different substances based on their availability. In addition 
to a high number of lone offenders, who deal in relatively 
small quantities of drugs, there are so-called ‘top sellers’, 
some of whom use organised structures and earn sizeable 
profits.
Darknet markets offer a convenient and safe distribution 
platform to individual criminals and OCGs alike. Trading on 
darknet markets allows distributors to reduce the risk of 
detection while being able to advertise to a large number of 
potential clients. Vendors can sell significant quantities of 
drugs as part of high-frequency, low-quantity transactions. 
For example, the most commonly sold unit of cocaine on 
the AlphaBay darknet market in 2011-2015 was 1 g (see 
Section 2.3, Table 2.8).
Organised crime involvement
There has been a substantial increase in the number of 
transactions involving drugs over the past years, and the 
number and quantities of individual sales is set to continue 
to grow. While the quantities of individual sales on darknet 
marketplaces remain relatively small, the overall volume 
of drugs traded online points to the involvement of OCGs, 
which are able to procure larger quantities of drugs and 
distribute them to individual buyers. Nonetheless, there are 
notable examples of vendors who do not fit the traditional 
profile of organised crime.
Some Member States have observed an increase in the 
level of professionalism displayed by vendors, which is 
indicative of the involvement of established OCGs. It 
is believed that some OCGs involved in the ‘traditional’ 
distribution of drugs via street dealers are increasingly 
using darknet market trading as an additional distribution 
channel and revenue stream. This professionalisation is 
also driven by the competitive nature of trading on darknet 
markets, which forces vendors to innovate and deliver a 
customer-focused service offering.
Recent investigations highlight the move of OCGs involved 
in the large-scale production of herbal cannabis in the EU 
to darknet markets for the distribution of their production 
output. In addition to the obvious benefits of mitigating 
the risk of law enforcement detection and reducing costs, 
this additional distribution platform allows OCGs to gain 
access to an additional client base, while maintaining their 
established distribution networks.
Small and medium-sized OCGs based outside the EU are 
believed to rely on darknet markets to supply them with 
synthetic drugs produced in the EU. It is, however, unclear 
whether the vendors offering these drugs are acting as 
mid-level suppliers and middle men, or are more closely 
associated with the OCGs involved in the large-scale 
production of these substances in the EU. The EU remains 
a key region for the production of synthetic drugs such as 
MDMA and amphetamine trafficked to destinations across 
Substantial profits
The revenues and profits of vendors on darknet 
marketplaces can be substantial.
In 2016, German law enforcement authorities arrested 
four suspects accused of distributing illicit drugs via 
darknet marketplaces between 2013 and 2016. The 
group had distributed illicit drugs exceeding a value of 
EUR 1.27 million to customers in 62 countries using 
post and parcel services (Focus Online, 2016).
Other successful vendors on darknet marketplaces 
are able to sell relatively large amounts of illicit drugs, 
generating even more substantial profits.
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FIGURE 3.1
A range of MDMA quantities offered on Hansa
the world. EU-based OCGs dominate the global production 
of MDMA and amphetamine (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016).
New business opportunities
The diminishing reliance on access to street networks 
of consumers of illicit commodities may challenge the 
established business models in many criminal markets. 
While most illicit trade is still carried out by OCGs, 
individual criminal entrepreneurs without access to 
networks of criminal contacts are able to directly enter 
criminal markets via online trade platforms (see Figure 3.1).
The proportion of drug trade conducted via darknet 
markets is still limited and has not diminished the role 
of established OCGs in the large-scale trafficking and 
production of drugs in the EU, and is unlikely to challenge 
them in their function as primary wholesale suppliers. 
However, polydrug-trafficking OCGs involved in the street-
level distribution of illicit drugs tied to specific territories or 
regions may find themselves competing with smaller OCGs 
focusing on the online distribution of illicit drugs directly 
to consumers. OCGs operating on darknet markets are not 
tied to a specific territory and can operate using a much 
leaner infrastructure.
Resilience
The darknet has proven to be a very resilient environment, 
able to quickly absorb law enforcement actions such as the 
takedown of major marketplaces. Following the takedown 
of a darknet market, trading activities are reduced for a 
short time. However, vendors and customers alike will 
quickly migrate to alternative existing or newly emerging 
darknet markets. The most recent example is the rapid 
growth of several darknet markets, such as TradeRoute and 
Dream, following the takedown of AlphaBay and Hansa.
Online vendors have quickly developed countermeasures to 
protect against the monitoring of online marketplaces and 
investigations carried out by law enforcement authorities. 
Such monitoring includes technical investigations of 
the platforms and trading activity, as well as financial 
investigations into the money flows associated with the 
drugs trade on the darknet. For instance, previously, 
communication between vendors and customers was 
unencrypted. However, following the major takedowns of 
Silk Road and Silk Road 2.0, most communication on these 
platforms is now carried out using multilayered encryption. 
Similarly, whereas transactions did not previously require 
multisignature, multisignature transactions are now 
common to many of the most frequently used darknet 
markets. In some cases, surface web vendors redirect their 
customers to mirror sites on the darknet or advertise their 
products using false product designations or descriptions.
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Converting the proceeds of crime
The use of cryptocurrencies is an in-built feature for 
most darknet markets. Vendors receive payment for their 
goods in cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin. These funds 
can be used to directly purchase other goods on darknet 
platforms or, increasingly, for legitimate purchases. Funds 
generated from the trade in illicit drugs on darknet markets 
are generally used to purchase other products, sourcing 
additional drugs for further distribution, or are converted to 
traditional currencies as profit.
The cryptocurrencies used for payment on darknet markets 
are and can be exchanged for fiat currency. The conversion 
of cryptocurrencies into major currencies such as euros or 
US dollars allows vendors to use the proceeds of their sales 
outside the darknet ecosystem.
Virtual currency exchanges act as brokers and allow users 
to buy or sell virtual money for a variable fee. An exchange 
works like any other currency exchange: the user converts 
a fiat currency into a virtual one or vice versa. Alternatively, 
users can also convert one form of virtual currency to 
another.
In order to use a virtual currency exchange, users register 
for an account with the exchange. The majority of popular 
exchanges require users to provide identification to open 
an account. Criminals are able to circumvent the pre-set 
verification processes of exchanges that require identity 
verification by relying on fraudulent identity documents, 
which are widely available on darknet markets. Some 
exchanges now require customers to verify their identity 
via Skype (or a similar telecommunication software 
application) or by producing pictures of themselves with 
their identification documents.
Some exchanges require no verification of identity and 
have made the protection of the client’s identity part of 
their mission statement. This allows criminals to use the 
profits generated by trading in illicit drugs on the darknet 
to anonymously buy and sell cryptocurrencies, converting 
digital proceeds into analogue profits.
Exchange services accept different payment methods, 
predominantly bank transfers and credit or debit card 
payments, for the purchase and sale of cryptocurrencies. 
Some also offer the use of money service businesses, 
such as Western Union and MoneyGram, PayPal and bank 
cheques, and some even dispense cash via cash deposits 
or cash in mail. Cash, in particular, remains the medium of 
choice for money launderers and criminals seeking to make 
purchases or reinvest their criminal proceeds.
Cash continues to play an important role when it comes 
to realising criminal gains; there are well-established 
methodologies for laundering cash, and it is as readily 
exchangeable, untraceable and anonymous as the 
cryptocurrencies favoured in the digital underground. As a 
result, virtual currencies have yet to be adopted to any large 
degree by established money launderers, who are likely to 
favour long-established methodologies.
Cryptocurrencies are likely to become more attractive, 
however, both online and offline, with several new 
currencies already establishing themselves on the criminal 
markets. Whether or not any of these cryptocurrencies will 
grow to challenge the role of bitcoin in terms of criminal 
use will remain to be seen, but some of these alternative 
cryptocurrencies appear to offer greater anonymity to 
criminals (see Chapter 1).
While knowledge and experience of how to investigate, 
trace and seize virtual currencies continues to grow in 
the law enforcement community, enhanced by various 
private sector tools for attribution, this is often limited to 
bitcoin and not the other cryptocurrencies emerging on 
the criminal markets. Successful law enforcement activity 
related to bitcoin-using criminals may further lead to more 
criminals using alternative cryptocurrencies.
Digital money laundering as a service
In July 2017, Greek law enforcement authorities 
arrested a Russian national wanted in the United 
States for allegedly leading a substantial money-
laundering operation. The suspect is accused of 
laundering more than EUR 3.5 billion (USD 4 billion) 
through bitcoin transactions.
Greek law enforcement authorities described the 
suspect as the leader of a sophisticated criminal 
organisation that owns, operates and manages ‘one of 
the largest cybercrime websites in the world’.
US authorities allege that the suspect facilitated 
crimes including hacking, fraud, identity theft, tax 
refund fraud, public corruption and drug trafficking 
during his time in the digital currency market.
Source: The Guardian (2017).
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Knowledge gaps
There are significant knowledge gaps around the darknet 
trade in drugs. While vendor and customer interactions are 
well researched and understood, there is limited knowledge 
regarding the actors and mechanisms involved in this trade 
beyond the distribution/sales phase in the drug-trafficking 
chain (see Figure 3.2).
The takedown of darknet marketplaces, such as the original 
Silk Road, Silk Road 2.0, and, most recently, the AlphaBay 
and Hansa markets, has provided law enforcement 
authorities with significant insight into the functioning and 
interactions on darknet marketplaces. Successful follow-up 
investigations have been able to identify several high-
profile vendors, which operated profitable vendor profiles 
and darknet trading business ventures.
However, some knowledge gaps remain, particularly in 
relation to the extent of the involvement of traditional OCGs 
in the darknet trade in illicit drugs and in the financial flows 
associated with the profits generated on darknet market 
platforms.
Additional law enforcement actions and follow-up 
investigations of successful takedowns will probably 
provide law enforcement authorities with additional 
insight into this aspect of trade on darknet markets. 
Law enforcement authorities will need to enhance their 
intelligence picture and gain a better understanding of the 
role of the darknet trade in illicit drugs in order to effectively 
combat this phenomenon.
3.2 Challenges
Law enforcement authorities and prosecution services 
encounter various challenges in combating cybercrime and 
especially in pursuing investigations on the darknet.
Eurojust and Europol have jointly identified a number of 
challenges, which include loss of data, loss of location, 
legal frameworks, public–private partnerships, international 
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Crypto-vulnerabilities
The use of cryptocurrencies is no guarantee of 
complete anonymity and immunity from prosecution if 
funds are used for criminal purposes on the darknet.
In February 2017, the Danish National Police Cyber 
Crime Center (NC3) announced a breakthrough in 
using new methods to track and identify darknet 
users. This new technique, which relies on bitcoin 
transaction analysis, has already been used in practice 
to identify individuals and help prosecute darknet 
traders.
Source: Anklagemyndigheden (Danish Prosecutor’s Office) (2017).
Take-downs generate intelligence
Early takedowns such as the closure of the original 
Silk Road have provided law enforcement authorities 
with much-needed insight into the functioning of the 
darknet market environment.
Based on analysis of the data obtained from the Silk 
Road takedown, US law enforcement authorities were 
able to identify and prosecute one of the platform’s 
top vendors based in the EU. The Dutch national 
was sentenced to 10 years in prison after pleading 
guilty to selling 104 kg of MDMA and 566 000 MDMA 
tablets, 4 kg of cocaine, 3 kg of benzodiazepines, 
and substantial quantities of amphetamine, LSD and 
cannabis to customers in the United States.
Source: The Register (2014).
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cooperation and the rapidly developing threat landscape 
and resulting expertise gap.
Loss of data
Data retention
The overturning of the Data Retention Directive (DRD) 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its ruling of 
8 April 2014 (12) has left law enforcement and prosecutors 
uncertain about the possibilities of obtaining data from 
private parties. In some Member States there is legislation 
in place to ensure that internet service providers (ISPs) 
retain data for law enforcement purposes, whereas in other 
Member States national legislation has been annulled in 
the wake of the ECJ judgment. In those Member States, 
ISPs retain some data for commercial or accounting 
purposes, but have no data available to support law 
enforcement investigations. Such discrepancies impede 
the work of law enforcement authorities and may result in 
the loss of investigative leads and ultimately reduce the 
ability to effectively prosecute online criminal activity.
In its Tele2 Sverige and Watson ruling of 21 December 
2016 (13), the Court did not go so far as to deem data 
retention per se unlawful. In interpreting the e-Privacy 
Directive, the Court highlighted that a Member State is not 
prevented from introducing legislation that would facilitate 
the targeted retention of traffic and location data for the 
preventive purpose of fighting serious crime. It is also 
very important to acknowledge that the use of retained 
communications data may help to clear persons suspected 
of serious crimes without resorting to other more intrusive 
means of surveillance, such as the interception of commu-
nications or house searches.
As described in Europol’s 2017 Internet Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment (IOCTA) report (Europol, 2017c), 
operational experiences have shown that electronic 
communication data are key to the successful investigation 
and prosecution of serious crimes including criminal 
activity on darknet marketplaces. The lack of the unified 
retention of electronic communication data across the EU 
has proven a key obstacle to investigating cross-border 
cybercrime. Recent developments and case-law with an 
impact on data retention regulations have presented law 
enforcement authorities with significant obstacles in their 
(12) ECLI (2014), European Case Law Identifier, Judgment of 8 April 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (case C-2A93/12).
(13) ECLI (2016), European Case Law Identifier, Judgment of 21 December 
2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970 (cases C-203/15 and C-698/15). 
operational work, particularly when it comes to identifying 
and investigating high-value targets.
Carrier-grade network address translation 
This loss-of-data challenge also affects the widespread 
implementation of carrier-grade network address 
translation (often called carrier-grade NAT (CGN)) by 
ISPs. Carrier-grade NAT allows a single IP (internet 
protocol) address to be shared by, potentially, thousands 
of subscribers/end users on the same network 
simultaneously. CGN is used by 95 % of mobile providers 
(network operators and mobile virtual network operators) 
and almost 50 % of traditional ISPs worldwide. CGN 
prevents ISPs and electronic content providers from logging 
certain types of information, such as source port numbers 
and destination IP addresses that would otherwise allow 
law enforcement to associate criminal activity with an end 
user. Investigators may be confronted with long lists of 
potentially hundreds or thousands of end users associated 
with a particular public IP address, the investigation of 
which requires many resources, incurs large delays, and 
generates privacy and data protection issues for many 
innocent customers.
Encryption
A growing number of electronic service providers 
implement default encryption for their services. At the 
same time, tools that enable personal encryption of 
communications and other data are widely available and 
promoted. While this counts as a positive development 
towards increasing cybersecurity in general, the 
possibilities for digital forensic analysis are negatively 
affected as a result of the increased implementation of 
encryption. This leads to a situation where criminals are 
able to effectively and indefinitely hide critical evidence and 
activities from law enforcement. More than three quarters 
of cybercrime investigations in the EU involve the use of 
some form of encryption to protect data. Almost half of the 
Member States also noted the increased use of encrypted 
email. The growing use of encryption by criminals to 
protect their communications or stored data can lead to 
the loss of critical intelligence and evidence. The increase 
of operational security measures, such as the use of 
multi-layered encryption among criminals, creates serious 
challenges for investigators.
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Virtual currencies
The widening use of decentralised virtual currencies by 
criminals and the increased use of tumbling/mixing services 
effectively prevent law enforcement agencies from ‘following 
the money’ and significantly hinder asset recovery and the 
prevention of fraudulent transactions. The lack of (minimum) 
standards of due diligence and know-your-customer (14) 
processes for such services and the non-application of 
existing regulations compound the problem. A growing 
number of investigations involving cryptocurrencies and 
blockchain analytics highlights the need for expertise, tools 
and legislative and regulatory means to ‘follow the money’ to 
be at the disposal of law enforcement and judicial authorities.
Loss of location
Recent trends such as the increasing use of encryption, 
anonymisation tools, virtual currencies and the darknet by 
criminals have led to a situation where law enforcement 
may no longer be able to (reliably) establish the physical 
location of the perpetrator, the criminal infrastructure or the 
electronic evidence. This loss of location is a substantial 
barrier to effective investigations and prosecutions. In such 
situations, it is often unclear which country has jurisdiction 
and what legal framework regulates the collection of 
evidence or the use of special investigative powers, such 
as the monitoring of online criminal activities and various 
undercover measures. The growing use of cloud-based 
storage and services means that data can be located in 
physically different jurisdictions.
In addition to jurisdictional issues, loss of location also 
presents significant challenges during the investigative 
phase. It is increasingly difficult to establish the physical 
location of the servers hosting darknet markets and to map 
a market’s infrastructure.
Legal framework
Differences in legislation
Despite the existence of international legislative 
instruments, differences between domestic legal 
frameworks in the EU Member States and international 
instruments often prove to be a serious impediment to 
international criminal investigation and the prosecution of 
crimes with an online dimension, such as the trade in illicit 
drugs on darknet markets.
(14) As an example, see the recommendations proposed by the Financial 
Action Task Force (available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf).
The main differences relate to the criminalisation of 
conduct and the provisions to investigate cybercrime and 
gather electronic evidence. The adaptation and alignment 
of these legal frameworks is often time-consuming and 
difficult because of the rapid evolution of the online 
threat landscape. Existing operational processes could 
be harmonised and streamlined, and forensic-technical 
standards for the collection and transfer of electronic 
evidence could be developed.
The proliferation of the internet, its impact on traditional 
types of criminality such as the trade in illicit drugs and the 
growing sophistication of cybercrime require dedicated 
legislation that regulates law enforcement presence and 
action in an online environment more specifically.
Online investigations
Similarly, there is a growing need for a harmonised legal 
framework at EU level for conducting online investigations 
(Council of the European Union, 2016a), which would allow 
more effective joint operational actions such as large-scale 
botnet and/or underground criminal forum takedowns. 
The lack of the harmonisation of efforts to monitor online 
criminal activities and to lawfully collect critical evidence 
on darknet markets hinders effective operational activities 
and complicates the subsequent presentation of evidence 
in judicial proceedings. In response to these challenges, 
the European Commission will put forward a new legal 
instrument to regulate the use of electronic evidence in 
early 2018.
In some cases, investigators may be deterred from 
carrying out investigations on the darknet because of a 
lack of awareness of the tools available to them. In many 
jurisdictions, the monitoring of darknet marketplaces 
requires no special covert activity on the part of the 
investigator beyond the use of an anonymous account.
International cooperation
The collection of electronic evidence is often a time-sensitive 
issue. The current process of mutual legal assistance 
(MLA) is perceived by practitioners as being too slow and 
cumbersome to gather and share evidence effectively. 
MLA is a method of between-state cooperation, used to 
obtain assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
criminal offences. MLA is generally used to obtain material 
that cannot be obtained on a police-cooperation basis, 
particularly material that must be obtained by coercive 
means. Because of the differences in legal systems and 
frameworks, the early coordination and involvement of 
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the judicial authorities is necessary. There is a clear need 
to streamline the MLA process wherever possible, for 
instance by aligning and using existing model requests 
and using a common taxonomy of cybercrime terminology. 
The implementation of the European Investigation Order 
(EIO) Directive may go some way towards addressing these 
issues for the majority of Member States. However, the EIO 
framework may not accommodate the speed that is required 
to capture electronic evidence. The EIO Directive also 
does not contain provisions that specifically facilitate the 
collection of common types of electronic evidence, meaning 
that additional tools need to be developed to facilitate the 
collection of electronic evidence under the EIO framework.
The various existing legal tools and mechanisms could 
be better promoted at international level. There is also 
a clear need for a better mechanism for cross-border 
communication and the exchange of information for the 
purpose of investigation, prevention and protection, but also 
to ensure that any ensuing MLA request conforms with all 
the relevant legal requirements of the country in question.
The current differences in legal frameworks and the 
existing challenges to effective international cooperation 
may lead to the emergence of virtual safe havens in the 
online environment, where criminal investigation and 
prosecution as well as evidence collection are challenging. 
By design, the darknet is an environment that, while not 
impenetrable by law enforcement authorities, does function 
to hinder monitoring and investigative efforts.
Skills gap 
Cybercrime and online criminality are evolving rapidly, at 
a scale and speed never before seen, making it difficult 
for law enforcement and prosecutors to keep pace. 
Current and expected trends require an increasing level 
of practitioner expertise. Currently no EU-wide standards 
for the training and certification of such practitioners 
exist. Nonetheless, existing initiatives at EU level, such 
as the European Cybercrime Training and Education 
Group (ECTEG), the Training of Trainers (TOT) Project 
and the training activities under the EMPACT (European 
Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats) policy 
framework carried out in cooperation with CEPOL (the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training), are 
already paving the way towards addressing the expertise 
gap at EU level. Still, the alignment of existing programmes 
within Member States and the implementation of current 
EU-wide initiatives is necessary. Other training and 
capacity-building initiatives also exist at international level, 
supported by organisations such as Interpol and the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
3.3 Responses
Criminality on the darknet is rapidly evolving, and law 
enforcement authorities are confronted with an increasing 
number of cases and incidents related to criminal activity 
taking place on the darknet and darknet markets. Criminality 
on the darknet is truly global in scope and affects all EU 
Member States. Despite growing recognition that darknet 
markets are emerging as key distribution platforms for illicit 
drugs, the level of response and the capacities deployed to 
fight this phenomenon vary considerably across the EU.
Illicit drugs are the main commodity sold on the darknet. 
However, in most cases drug units investigating the 
trafficking and distribution of drugs still focus on traditional 
drug-trafficking activities and distribution. While this 
arguably reflects the relatively small proportion of illicit 
drugs traded on the darknet, it is clear that this and 
similar platforms provide convenient, new and innovative 
opportunities for the drugs trade and that there has been a 
noticeable increase in the number of these cases.
Law enforcement authorities in the EU have followed a 
number of strategies to counter the trade in illicit drugs via 
darknet markets (RAND Europe, 2016), as discussed below.
Traditional investigative techniques
Investigations into the trade in illicit drugs on the darknet 
have presented law enforcement authorities with 
challenges. Traditional investigative techniques typically 
applied for investigating the drugs trade focus on targeting 
OCGs and individuals using interception of communication, 
surveillance and other techniques. While these ‘traditional’ 
drug-trafficking organisations increasingly rely on online 
technologies to communicate more securely, much 
of their business still concerns the moving of physical 
commodities. Drugs investigators often seem to be 
ill-equipped to deal with the trade in drugs on the darknet, 
which requires investigative techniques and expertise more 
typically found within units combating cybercrime.
While additional cyber-related expertise is required to 
identify vendors operating on darknet marketplaces, these 
traditional investigative techniques remain valuable and 
essential for follow-up investigations and to build strong 
cases against darknet market vendors.
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Postal detection and interception
The trade in illicit drugs on darknet markets is intimately 
linked with an increase in the distribution of illicit drugs via 
post and parcel services. The possible detection of drug 
shipments bought on darknet markets is a key vulnerability 
of the darknet trade in drugs. While online purchases can 
be anonymised to a large degree and represent significant, 
but not insurmountable, obstacles for the identification of 
vendors and customers, the physical parcels need to be 
submitted and received at specific locations (Figure 3.3).
Vendors have developed various countermeasures to 
prevent the detection of parcels containing drugs. These 
involve the concealment of the substances in parcels and 
their incorporation into parcels with other goods, as well as 
the use of distraction packages containing small amounts 
of illicit drugs to divert the attention of law enforcement 
authorities from the ‘real’ shipment. These techniques 
largely mirror those employed by OCGs in the traditional 
trafficking of illicit drugs.
The overall volume of legitimate parcel traffic has 
increased significantly over recent years and prohibits the 
use of systematic and effective control measures by law 
enforcement authorities to identify and intercept all but a 
few suspicious parcels. So far, the risk profiling of parcels, 
akin to the methodologies used to identify suspect cargo 
shipments, has proven difficult because of the volume of 
regular parcel traffic.
Law enforcement authorities closely monitor developments 
in this area and cooperate with the private sector, including 
major transportation and logistics service providers, in 
order to identify and intercept potential drug shipments. 
The use of traditional forensic investigation techniques, 
such as the fingerprinting of parcels, first requires the 
successful identification of drug shipments. Increasing 
the rate of detections in combination with the efficient 
use of information exchange systems by law enforcement 
authorities to share forensic data could aid investigations 
into the darknet trade in illicit drugs. Enhanced cooperation 
between police and customs authorities in carrying out 
controlled deliveries and implementing other mitigation 
strategies will also strengthen the law enforcement 
responses to the online trade in illicit drugs.
Some new approaches to the shipping of parcels with 
complete anonymity potentially offer an opportunity for 
vendors and buyers of illicit goods on darknet markets to 
overcome the vulnerability of trafficking physical goods 
using parcels. The first proofs of concept of blockchain-
based anonymous physical package delivery systems 
have been developed by academia (AlTawy et al., 2017). 
The implementation of such systems would probably 
further hinder the efforts of law enforcement authorities to 
intercept drug shipments and identify the vendors of illicit 
drugs on darknet markets.
Monitoring darknet markets
Law enforcement authorities in the EU actively monitor 
online marketplaces to identify trends, such as the most 
popular darknet markets, the substances traded, the most 
prolific vendors active on specific darknet markets, price 
FIGURE 3.3
Envelope with Amsterdam postmark containing 
MDMA purchased online and delivered to 
a customer in Austria
Source: Bundeskriminalamt, Austria.
Operation Porto
In May 2017, Austrian and German law enforcement 
authorities concluded Operation Porto, which targeted 
vendors and customers purchasing illicit drugs on 
darknet markets.
The operation resulted in the initiation of 697 
investigations into individual suspects, as well as the 
seizure of 35 kg of various types of drugs in Austria.
The operation also highlights the close link between 
the darknet trade in drugs and parcel trafficking. 
Control actions carried out as part of the operation 
in Germany resulted in the seizure of 6 000 parcels 
containing more than 175 kg of drugs. The recipients 
of the parcels were based in 60 countries worldwide.
Source: Der Standard (2017).
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developments, the flow of virtual currencies and other 
innovations in this area.
The regular monitoring of darknet markets yields 
intelligence on top vendors, prices, available substances 
and other trends. However, an efficient law enforcement 
response requires a multidisciplinary approach and multi-
agency cooperation including follow-up investigations 
to convert intelligence gathered online into concrete 
investigative leads such as the identity of vendors.
Cyberpatrol actions bring together experienced 
investigators and experts in an intelligence-gathering 
exercise to map out criminality on the darknet. The 
objective of these exercises is to identify actors and 
targets active on darknet markets, as well as to support 
investigators in prioritising targets and deconflicting 
investigations. A good intelligence picture allows law 
enforcement authorities to focus resources and activities 
on investigating the most active and prolific vendors. 
The deconfliction of investigations is essential to prevent 
interference from different investigations.
Cyberpatrol actions allow law enforcement authorities to 
gather intelligence and identify high-value vendors and targets 
and their criminal activities, with the objective of initiating 
follow-up investigations and operations. Overall, these actions 
contribute to the development of a common law enforcement 
approach as well as innovative tools, techniques and tactics to 
combat criminality on the darknet and to deter criminals from 
becoming active on darknet markets.
These actions significantly improve the cooperation 
between investigators targeting different types of 
criminality, including drug trafficking, firearm trafficking, the 
distribution of counterfeit documents and the trade of any 
other illicit commodities on the darknet.
Disrupting darknet trade
The disruption of darknet markets is a key area of activity 
for law enforcement authorities in the fight against the 
online trade in illicit goods. In many cases, these actions 
have targeted the largest darknet markets in terms of the 
number of vendors, sales and products on offer.
Overall, these actions have disrupted the online trade in 
illicit drugs and reduced overall trade activity. They have 
also generated intelligence and investigative leads, allowing 
investigators to focus on the most successful vendors 
and the most active buyers. Disrupting darknet trade also 
undermines customer confidence in the reliability and 
availability of darknet markets.
While this approach has delivered the desired short-term 
objective of disrupting online trading activity, it has also 
revealed the resilience of darknet market trading. Once 
a major marketplace has been taken down, vendors and 
customers quickly migrate to alternative platforms.
Recent high-profile international operations, such as 
Operations Onymous, Bayonet and GraveSac, have generated 
substantial intelligence and awareness of the quickly 
expanding scope of the trade in illicit drugs on the darknet.
The exploitation of the anonymity provided by the darknet in 
combination with other encrypted means of communication 
and payment systems, such as cryptocurrencies, poses 
a challenge for law enforcement authorities in terms of 
detection, attribution and disruption. Although the exact 
Operation Hyperion
In October 2016, law enforcement authorities from 
across the world came together to carry out Operation 
Hyperion. The operation targeted buyers and sellers 
of illicit drugs, weapons and fake and stolen identities, 
and other illicit activities using darknet marketplaces.
As a result of Operation Hyperion, Swedish law 
enforcement authorities arrested Sweden’s largest 
suspected darknet marketplace vendor, suspected 
of making millions of Swedish kronor in profit 
by distributing illicit drugs in the country and to 
customers outside Sweden (DeepDotWeb, 2016).
As part of Operation Hyperion, the National 
Prosecution Service of the Netherlands launched 
a hidden service to showcase the detection and 
prosecution of many large vendors on darknet 
markets.
Operation Hyperion was carried out by law 
enforcement authorities in Australia, Canada, Finland, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
and was supported by Europol.
The takedown of a darknet market provides 
investigators with a rich data source. Exploring 
and analysing the accumulated data gained from 
several takedowns in a central database generates 
investigative leads. The planning and execution of 
Operation Hyperion was made possible by analysis of 
data obtained through Operation Onymous and other 
investigations into darknet trading activity.
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scale of the criminality on the darknet cannot yet be fully 
determined, the darknet is clearly an established criminal 
environment hosting an increasing number of platforms, 
including darknet markets and other hidden services.
A new integrated approach — darknet 
investigations teams
Law enforcement authorities tackle the distribution of illicit 
commodities on darknet markets as part of international 
operations and investigations at national level. Many 
of these actions focus on disrupting the trade in illicit 
drugs online by removing or taking down platforms 
and identifying vendors for further investigations and 
prosecution. The majority of law enforcement investigations 
on the darknet focus on markets selling illicit drugs — or at 
least the vendors and buyers thereon.
However, so far most Member State law enforcement 
authorities have not created dedicated units to specifically 
tackle trade on darknet markets. The combination of a lack 
of coordination, the deconfliction of cases, and operations 
on national and international levels results in an overall 
knowledge gap in relation to darknet-related crime.
Responding to the need for a more coherent approach to 
fighting criminality on the darknet, Europol is promoting 
the concept of darknet investigations teams, which could 
be implemented by coordinating and executive agencies at 
national and international levels.
These teams, one of which is being established at Europol, 
will analyse intelligence on a daily basis and assist in the 
prioritisation and coordination of darknet-related cases. 
Darknet investigations teams will need to rely upon 
available secure communication channels and databases, 
as well as robust data protection and confidentiality 
arrangements.
Darknet investigations teams will coordinate the fight 
against the criminality on the darknet by gathering 
intelligence, providing operational support, engaging in the 
coordination of joint technical and investigative actions, and 
ensuring deconfliction between ongoing investigative efforts. 
These teams will also support the prioritisation of top targets 
and threats, driving technical development, centralising 
expertise, carrying out training and building capacities.
Darknet investigations teams will bring together key 
capabilities such as analytical support, specialised 
expertise to support case development, technical expertise 
and practical cooperation with law enforcement and 
non-law enforcement stakeholders. It is envisaged that this 
Operation Onymous
On 6 November 2014, law enforcement and judicial 
agencies around the globe undertook a joint action 
against darknet markets running as hidden services 
on the Tor network. Sixteen European countries, 
alongside counterparts from the United States, 
brought down several marketplaces as part of a 
unified international action from Europol’s operational 
coordination centre in The Hague.
The action aimed to stop the sale, distribution and 
promotion of illicit and harmful items, including 
weapons and drugs, which were being sold on 
darknet markets. Operation Onymous, coordinated 
by Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), 
the FBI, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and 
Eurojust, resulted in 17 arrests of the vendors and 
administrators running these online marketplaces and 
more than 600 onion addresses being taken down. In 
addition, bitcoin worth approximately USD 1 million 
and EUR 180 000 in cash, drugs, gold and silver were 
seized. The darknet market Silk Road 2.0 was taken 
down by the FBI and the US ICE HSI.
Operation Onymous had a significant short-term 
impact on the darknet environment by removing 
key marketplaces and displacing trading activity to 
existing smaller marketplaces or newly emerging 
marketplaces. Following the closure of major 
marketplaces, such as a Silk Road 2.0, the prices of 
illicit goods on surviving marketplaces increased in 
the immediate aftermath of the takedown. However, 
longer term studies indicate that price levels quickly 
returned to their pre-takedown levels, as vendors and 
customers migrated to alternative darknet markets 
(Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, 2016).
Despite its success in closing down some of the 
most threatening darknet markets in terms of 
turnover and trading activity, Operation Onymous 
also demonstrated the resilience of the darknet 
market environment: as one major marketplace closes 
down,the next most credible markets absorb the 
displaced business of that market.
Operation Onymous’s operational outcomes are 
impressive and also highlight the effectiveness 
of international law enforcement cooperation at 
tackling online criminality, including on the darknet. 
However, they also reveal that takedowns of darknet 
markets alone result in only short-term gains for law 
enforcement and that effective disruption strategies 
require a broader and more integrated approach to 
monitoring, intervention and investigation.
Source: Europol (2014).
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capacity will also include the comprehensive involvement 
of digital forensic teams, access to experts on the different 
commodities traded on the darknet including illicit drugs, 
and outreach through networks and to the private sector.
A joint operational international 
taskforce
A second and complementary approach to fighting the 
distribution of illicit goods on darknet markets closely 
follows the highly successful concept of joint operational 
international taskforces. This mature and well-tested model 
of operational and concrete law enforcement cooperation 
has been successfully deployed to fight other types of 
cyber-dependent crime.
A joint operational international taskforce focusing on 
darknet markets will enhance the coordination and 
deconfliction of operations and investigations on an 
international level, and will further develop knowledge and 
expertise that can be shared across borders.
This taskforce would formulate and implement a European 
strategy against threats posed by the darknet including the 
trade in illicit drugs. The core elements of such a strategy 
are the creation of a deconfliction model, priority setting 
and the formulation of a joint operational action plan.
A joint operational international darknet taskforce will allow 
a coordinated approach to fighting the trade in drugs on 
the darknet and a more tactical and coordinated response 
to criminality on the darknet generally. Emulating existing 
successful ventures in other areas, this taskforce approach 
should be based on partnerships between law enforcement 
authorities, industry and academia.
3.6 Outlook
The trade in illicit drugs on the darknet has emerged as 
a common feature of European drugs markets and is a 
key challenge for law enforcement authorities seeking to 
disrupt the online trade in illicit goods and services. Law 
enforcement authorities expect the emergence of new 
darknet markets in response to successful takedowns and, 
without an effective approach to disrupt this distribution 
channel, an increase in darknet trading in illicit drugs over 
the coming years.
Darknet markets have the potential to partially displace 
existing traditional drug markets and make illicit drugs 
available to an even wider customer base than is already 
the case.
Unless effective action is taken, the profitability and 
reduced risk of detection and prosecution associated with 
the darknet trade in illicit drugs will increasingly attract 
organised groups seeking to exploit this environment.
Law enforcement authorities face a number of challenges 
in confronting this threat. Technical obstacles that form 
part of the design of darknet markets can be overcome, 
but they require concerted action and the availability of 
a range of expertise, which is so far lacking in many law 
enforcement authorities.
Current legislation is not fully equipped to provide law 
enforcement authorities with the tools needed to ensure 
that takedowns and other disruptive activities designed to 
deter darknet trading in illicit drugs and degrade trust in 
darknet market platforms have maximum effect. Legislative 
challenges such as the lack of online investigative powers 
and the absence of a harmonised framework for handling 
electronic evidence are impediments to the pursuit of 
effective investigations into darknet market trading. 
Existing legislation should be adapted to reflect the needs 
of practitioners and to equip law enforcement authorities 
and the judiciary with the tools they need to respond to 
criminality on the darknet.
However, an integrated approach reliant on international 
cooperation has the potential to more effectively make a 
sustainable impact on such criminal activity. Coordinated 
actions, such as those used to take down the AlphaBay 
and Hansa markets, and an improved common information 
position, resulting from shared law enforcement patrolling, 
have reduced the use of the darknet market environment as 
a platform for the trade in illicit drugs.
In the past, law enforcement responses to emerging 
threats have been reactive rather than proactive. Today, 
EU law enforcement authorities have mature capabilities 
to fight cybercrime, as well as a partnership network that 
provides an innovative and collaborative response to this 
challenge. However, arguably, the response to cybercrime 
as an emerging crime threat was only fully realised after 
cybercrime had already made a significant impact on the 
security and safety of citizens, businesses and public 
authorities.
There is now a window of opportunity to address and 
disrupt the growing threat from the online trade in drugs 
and other illicit commodities on the darknet before 
such markets fully emerge as prominent distribution 
mechanisms for illicit drugs in the EU.
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Major international law enforcement operations shut down AlphaBay and Hansa
Two major law enforcement operations, led by the FBI, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Dutch National 
Police, with the support of Europol, shut down the infrastructure of an underground criminal economy responsible for 
the trading of over 350 000 illicit commodities including drugs, firearms and cybercrime malware. The coordinated law 
enforcement action in Europe and the United States ranks as one of the most sophisticated takedown operations ever seen 
in the fight against online criminal activities.
AlphaBay was the largest criminal marketplace on the darknet, utilising a hidden service on the Tor network to effectively 
mask user identities and server locations. Prior to its takedown, AlphaBay reached over 200 000 users and 40 000 vendors. 
A conservative estimation of USD 1 billion has been transacted in this market since its creation in 2014. Transactions 
were paid in bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Hansa was the third largest criminal marketplace on the darknet, trading 
in similarly high volumes of illicit drugs and other commodities. Both markets were created to facilitate the expansion of a 
major underground criminal economy, which affected the lives of thousands of people around the world and was expressly 
designed to hinder the ability of law enforcement to bring offenders to justice.
The investigations
Europol has supported the investigation of criminal marketplaces on the darknet for a number of years. With the help of 
Bitdefender, an internet security company advising EC3, Europol provided Dutch authorities with an investigation lead 
into Hansa in 2016. Subsequent enquiries located the Hansa market infrastructure in the Netherlands, with follow-up 
investigations by the Dutch police leading to the arrest of its two administrators in Germany and the seizure of servers in 
the Netherlands, Germany and Lithuania. Europol and partner agencies in those countries supported the Dutch National 
Police with the take over of Hansa on 20 June 2017 under Dutch judicial authorisation, facilitating the covert monitoring 
of criminal activities on the platform until it was shut down on 20 July 2017. Since its take-down, the Dutch Police have 
collected valuable information on high-value targets and delivery addresses for a large number of orders. Some 10 000 
foreign addresses of Hansa market buyers were passed on to Europol for analysis.
In the meantime, an FBI- and DEA-led operation, called Bayonet, was able to identify the creator and administrator of 
AlphaBay, a Canadian citizen living a luxurious life in Thailand. On 5 July 2017, the main suspect was arrested in Thailand 
and the site taken down. Millions of dollars’ worth of cryptocurrencies were frozen and seized. Servers were also seized in 
Canada and the Netherlands.
Law enforcement strategy
In shutting down two of the three largest criminal marketplaces on the darknet, a major element of the infrastructure of 
the underground criminal economy has been taken offline. It has severely disrupted criminal enterprises around the world, 
led to the arrest of key figures involved in online criminal activity and yielded huge amounts of intelligence that will lead 
to further investigations. But what made this operation really special was the strategy developed by the FBI, the DEA, the 
Dutch police and Europol to magnify the disruptive impact of the joint action to take out AlphaBay and Hansa. This involved 
taking covert control of Hansa under Dutch judicial authority one month before Hansa’s take-down, which allowed Dutch 
police to monitor the activity of users without their knowledge, and shutting down AlphaBay during the same period. This 
meant that the Dutch police could identify and disrupt the regular criminal activity on Hansa and also identify new users 
displaced from AlphaBay who were looking for a new trading platform. This is apparent from the eight-fold increase in 
the number of new members of Hansa recorded immediately following the shutdown of AlphaBay. As a law enforcement 
strategy, leveraging the combined operational and technical strengths of multiple agencies in the United States and Europe, 
it has been an extraordinary success and provides an illustration of the collective power that the global law enforcement 
community can bring to disrupting major criminal activities.
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CHAPTER 4 
Conclusions and recommendations
This chapter provides key points and 
considerations stemming from the 
analysis presented in the previous 
chapters of this report.
4.1 Putting the darknet into 
context
Developments in information technology are transforming 
virtually all aspects of modern life, and this now includes 
the way that illicit goods are traded and the modus 
operandi used by OCGs. Online anonymous drug 
marketplaces can therefore be seen as part of a more 
general development for which addressing cybercrime and 
the use of information technology platforms for criminal 
purposes has become a more important policing priority 
across the EU. Innovation in criminal practices in this area 
represents a recognised challenge to established law 
enforcement practice and, if operational capacity is to 
keep pace, such innovation requires responses that are 
equally innovative and technologically informed. This report 
contributes to this objective by providing the conceptual 
framework necessary for understanding developments 
in this area, accompanied by an EU-focused analysis of 
darknet operations and a review of both the challenges to 
and the possible opportunities for law enforcement.
The analysis reported here supports the conclusion 
that drug transactions are a significant and important 
element of darknet market activities (although modest 
in value compared to the overall estimated retail drug 
trade in the EU), accounting for around two thirds of all 
offers made on the cryptomarkets reviewed. This report 
has also detailed how law enforcement interventions can 
disrupt darknet markets. That said, overall, this new online 
ecosystem appears relatively resilient to disruption, with 
new marketplaces becoming established and vendors and 
buyers quickly migrating to new platforms. This resilience, 
as well as the relatively large scale and diversity of drug 
market activity, means that current operational models 
that are considered appropriate for addressing some other 
forms of hidden online criminality, such as the marketing 
of illegal firearms or the facilitating of crimes against 
children, may not be directly transferable to, or sufficient 
in isolation for, tackling the online drug trade. Experience 
to date would suggest that, to increase the effectiveness 
of law enforcement activities, market disruption needs to 
form part of a broader, more integrated set of measures 
implemented as part of an overall strategy to address 
the drug market. This implies that the identification 
and targeting of major vendors, in addition to market 
administrators, is needed to prevent simply displacing 
activities from the targeted marketplaces to other 
marketplaces. It also implies that it is equally important to 
target the other key elements of the supply chain, such as 
production, precursor sourcing and bulk trafficking, without 
which the online market cannot function. To some extent 
this means recognising that established intelligence-
led policing approaches must be brought together, but 
conducted in a technologically-informed, coordinated and 
collaborative manner, if law enforcement activities are to 
have a sustained impact on the online drug trade.
4.2 National coordination 
and international collaboration 
are key to an effective response
Despite the need to consider activities from a more 
holistic, strategic perspective, darknet markets do present 
particular challenges that require specific responses. 
Darknet drug sales have been driven by the exploitation of 
the opportunities presented by new technologies, and this 
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remains a dynamic and developing area. To be effective, 
responses must have sufficient technical capacities and 
specialist, dedicated resources, configured to keep pace 
with new threats as they emerge. In practical terms, this 
presents both human-resource and investment challenges 
for already hard-pressed criminal investigation and 
prosecution services. Experience to date provides a strong 
argument for pooling national resources to create, multiply 
and share expert capacity, for example by creating darknet 
investigations units. In this context, a clear recommendation 
from the findings of this report is the need for capacity 
building and increased investment to support specialist 
investigation capacities. Currently, Member States are 
often faced with significant skills gaps for conducting 
investigations on the darknet, and many authorities 
lack experts who have both a technical understanding 
of cybercrime investigation and practical expertise in 
combating drug-related crime. Therefore, there is a need to 
map existing expertise and competencies and to invest in 
appropriate training and capacity-building exercises.
Pooling resources is also important at the European level, 
to create synergies, maximise the available resources 
and facilitate knowledge transfer. In addition, such 
European-level pooling of resources is appropriate, and 
necessary, because darknet markets rarely exist solely 
within one national jurisdiction and their physical location 
is also often uncertain. This problem is likely to increase, 
as developments in decentralised software will allow 
marketplaces to exist without residing on any individual 
server. This is a potential ‘dark cloud’ on the horizon 
for investigations and prosecutions in what is already a 
challenging judicial landscape. There are many practical 
advantages, at the European and International levels, 
to creating joint operational taskforces and coordinated 
actions, such as cyberpatrolling. Such coordination is likely 
to improve operational efficiency and support a shared 
understanding of the role of the darknet drugs trade in the 
overall understanding of the changing operational models 
used by OCGs. Thus, in summary, given the significant 
resource and technical demands of investigations on the 
darknet, this represents an area in which the sharing of 
intelligence, as well as operational best practice, is clearly 
essential. Effective international cooperation is important 
for effective resource management in an area in which 
activities need to be coordinated across jurisdictions.
It therefore follows that addressing jurisdiction issues and 
location uncertainties associated with online activities is 
a task that is likely to be successfully accomplished only 
through increased coordination between legal, technical 
and law enforcement professions in different Member 
States. In this context, it is important to note that, in the 
EU, the Council conclusions (Council of the European 
Union, 2016a) on improving criminal justice in cyberspace 
have set out a framework for structuring future work and 
concrete action in three main areas: streamlining MLA 
proceedings, improving cooperation with service providers 
and launching a reflection process on possible connecting 
factors for enforcement jurisdiction in cyberspace. The 
Council took note in December 2016 of the progress made 
so far by the Commission on the implementation of these 
conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2016b).
4.3 Understanding the darknet 
from a European perspective
One of the purposes of this report was to document what 
is currently known about darknet drug market operations 
within an EU context. In any analysis of this topic, the 
considerable difficulties of collecting data on an area of 
activity that is, by definition, seeking to remain hidden 
needs to be borne in mind. Caution is therefore needed in 
respect of the interpretation of the findings. Nonetheless, 
it is possible to comment on the current situation from an 
EU perspective and this is helpful for anticipating threats 
in this area. The trade in illicit drugs on darknet markets is 
a dynamic area subject to rapid change as marketplaces 
appear and disappear, in part through the actions of 
law enforcement but also often through other forms of 
disruption, such as exit scams. While quantification is 
difficult, overall the importance of this area, in respect of 
illicit drug supply, appears to be increasing, even though 
darknet markets still account for only a relatively modest 
proportion of overall drug sales. That said, revenues from 
drug sales derived from online sales are considerable, and 
thus the potential profits to be made by those who can 
develop successful online ‘businesses’ are likely to be an 
incentive for both new groups entering the market and 
established OCGs involved in drug production, trafficking 
or supply. The online trade also now appears to affect most 
EU Member States to some extent, through either access 
to global marketplaces or nationally targeted platforms. The 
EU appears to be an important base for suppliers providing 
drugs online, particularly stimulants. In the analysis of 
marketplaces conducted for this report, just under half 
of all sellers appeared to be located in EU countries, with 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands being 
most commonly identified. The availability of NPS on 
darknet marketplaces is currently relatively low, probably 
reflecting the significant role played by surface web sales in 
this sector. This may change, however, as these substances 
are increasingly being placed under control measures and 
other strategies are being developed to inhibit their open 
sale, such as engagement with producer countries.
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4.4 Knowledge gaps
This report highlights that we now know far more about 
the operations of darknet markets than was previously 
the case, and this can be seen from the number of recent, 
high-profile interventions targeting specific marketplaces. 
Despite this progress, it is important to recognise that 
significant knowledge gaps still exist, especially with 
respect to the role of traditional OCGs in this area. 
Importantly, to understand the growth potential of darknet 
markets and how to better disrupt them, it is necessary to 
understand better the origin, production and wholesale 
practices relevant to their sourcing. Currently, most of the 
activity observed appears to be vendor–client level or at 
the middle-market or retail level. A better understanding 
of what makes darknet markets attractive or unattractive 
to potential vendors and customers is also important. The 
rationale underpinning the operation of darknet markets 
(providing anonymity for both buyers and sellers) would 
suggest that darknet drug markets are most likely to be 
used for mid-volume or low-volume individual sales. This 
is simply because the financial risks of loss are likely to 
grow with large-value single anonymous transactions. This 
means not that bulk supply is not being facilitated by new 
technologies, but rather that it is less likely to take place on 
an anonymous basis. In addition, major suppliers may try to 
reduce risk by using intermediaries to manage low-volume 
sales. Currently, very little is known about the source of 
drugs supplied on darknet markets or how the supply 
chain is organised; clearly, this is an area requiring further 
consideration. It is also possible that buyers and sellers will 
move ‘off market’ once a successful relationship has been 
established. This would mirror behaviour patterns seen in 
other, more established drug markets where, once trust 
has been established between a buyer and seller, a more 
exclusive relationship may be established.
It is also important to gain a better understanding of how 
the relative attractiveness or unattractiveness of darknet 
marketplaces, to both buyers and sellers, is influenced by 
the wider, existing drug market and the factors that affect it. 
This is also likely to be important for explaining the national 
and regional differences observed in the use of online 
marketplaces. For example, the rigorous control of parcels 
by customs appears to inhibit international sales, but may 
drive the development of national marketplaces as we have 
seen in Finland and has also been observed elsewhere. 
The accessibility of drugs through other sources is also 
likely to be an important factor in influencing the extent 
to which consumers will be attracted to darknet markets. 
For example, for drug users living in remote geographical 
locations or where policing or other factors mean that drug 
availability is poor there may be more incentive to explore 
online options for drug supply. Currently, the motives and 
rationale for using online drug markets remain poorly 
understood, and this is an area that merits further research. 
Some studies suggest that avoiding the possible violence 
associated with the street drug market and obtaining what 
are considered ‘high-quality’ products have been cited as 
reasons for using online marketplaces. These findings are 
interesting and suggest that, potentially, virtual markets 
are associated with fewer harms than traditional drug 
markets. However, further research is necessary in this area 
before any conclusions can be made. Not all physical drug 
markets are directly linked with violent crime, for example. 
Furthermore, understanding the relationship between 
purity and potency, chemical composition, possible 
contamination, and the relative availability of different types 
of substances and their relationship to harm at both the 
individual and population levels is a complex topic.
4.5 Engagement with industry
Engagement with key industries, such as the information 
technology, social media, payment services, and 
commercial product distribution and collection 
industries, is likely to be increasingly important for both 
identifying new threats and the development of effective 
responses. Public–private cooperation is also likely to 
play an important role: the success of law enforcement 
operations against cyber-enabled crime often depends 
on the cooperation of private technological companies. 
In this context, there is a need for standardised rules of 
engagement with private industries.
4.6 Threat assessment: 
understanding the potential 
for development of online drug 
markets
The dynamic nature of online markets, their ability to evolve 
to counter threats and exploit new opportunities, and the 
introduction or adoption of new technologies mean that 
enhanced monitoring capacity in this area is crucial to 
ensure that responses keep pace with developments. In 
this context, there are a number possible developments 
that may pose additional threats with respect to the 
technologically assisted distribution and sale of drugs. 
Developments in the darknet market are among these, 
but may evolve in tandem with the exploitation of other 
technological platforms in ways that may bring about 
additional regulatory and law enforcement challenges.
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The potential threats already identified that may increase 
the challenges in responding to cyber-enabled drug supply 
include the development of decentralised software and 
new encryption technologies; new forms of parcel delivery 
and collection services; the greater integration of darknet 
markets with existing local drug markets; nationally based 
darknet markets; and the growing use of instant messaging 
applications. These are briefly discussed below, but require 
ongoing consideration.
There are barriers associated with accessing darknet 
markets in some key areas, but further technological 
developments or other innovative developments could 
potentially reduce these. Currently, law enforcement 
efforts often target the servers on which the marketplaces 
are hosted. Current software options allow servers to be 
partially hidden, but future software options may mean 
that a market need not be located on any individual server. 
Currently, some degree of technological sophistication 
is required to successfully access darknet drug markets. 
Although this is not an obstacle to many young people, 
it may be that developments in encryption and other 
software may increase the ease with which more 
technologically naive individuals may be able to access 
darknet marketplaces. The need to make traceable 
payments and the need to ship drugs to a fixed address 
are also potential barriers associated with using online 
platforms to buy drugs. Attention should therefore be 
given to assessing whether or not developments in 
remote payment technologies, including but not restricted 
to cryptocurrencies, and options for more convenient 
pick-up points for goods ordered online may increase the 
attractiveness of online platforms to potential drug buyers.
The need to keep pace with changes in this area is 
illustrated by the fact that evidence is beginning to 
emerge for the use of instant messaging and social media 
apps, together with global positioning system (GPS) 
technologies, for drug distribution in some European cities. 
These applications, if combined with existing darknet 
markets and distributed software to create a darkcloud-
based drug distribution platform linked to numerous 
low-volume local supplies, have the potential to disrupt 
existing organised-crime drug-trafficking models and 
pose even greater challenges to existing regulatory and 
law enforcement approaches. Currently, this risk is largely 
speculative, but it does, however, underline the urgent 
need for the systematic monitoring and assessment 
of the anonymous online ecosystem, conducted in the 
context of understanding the operation of the overall drug 
market. This is necessary to support the comprehensive 
and strategic analysis required to inform future policy and 
operational responses in this area, and to reduce both the 
health threats and the security threats that developments 
in the technologically-assisted marketing and sale of drugs 
and other illicit commodities now present.
All markets, including illicit ones, function to facilitate 
the exchange of goods or services. Therefore, markets 
will prosper if they confer advantages to both buyers and 
sellers. Considerations for consumers can include the 
level of choice, ease of availability, convenience, perceived 
quality and price. For illicit drug markets, the level of risk 
is also an important factor, as vendors and consumers will 
be attracted to markets that are associated with relatively 
low risks of detection, experiencing market-related violence 
and ‘rip offs’. Darknet markets provide a convenient 
sales channel for technologically-savvy drug users, and 
appear to have the potential to grow in the longer-term. It 
is possible that they will disrupt traditional drug markets 
in the same way as online markets have disrupted the 
traditional markets for some legitimate commodities, 
especially if they become more accessible to consumers 
(see Griffiths and Mounteney, 2016). However, changes 
in this area are currently difficult to predict. Importantly, 
they will not occur in isolation from broader developments 
in the illicit drug market as a whole, including the use 
of other technologies and platforms; the impact of law 
enforcement and regulatory efforts; and broader social 
and policy developments that may shape the supply of 
and demand for drugs more generally. For this reason, the 
systematic monitoring and assessment of the anonymous 
online ecosystem in the context of the overall drug market 
is necessary to support the comprehensive and strategic 
analysis needed to inform future policy and operational 
responses and to reduce the health and security threats 
that developments in this area now present.
Finally, changes are occurring rapidly in this area, and 
considerable challenges still exist with respect to our 
capacity to monitor these developments. This report 
summarises the current state of our understanding of 
the operation of darknet markets and how they can be 
successfully countered. It also highlights that greater 
investment and innovation are needed if we are to keep 
pace with the likely challenges in this area.
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Bitcoin: One of the most popular cryptocurrencies in use today. As of 22 August 2017, 
1 bitcoin = EUR 3 325.5 (1).
Bitcoin wallet: Also referred to as a ‘digital wallet’. Establishing such a wallet is an 
important step in the process of obtaining bitcoins. Just as bitcoins are the digital 
equivalent of cash, a bitcoin wallet is analogous to a physical wallet but, instead of storing 
bitcoins literally, what is stored is relevant information such as the secure private key used 
to access bitcoin addresses and carry out transactions. The four main types of wallet are 
the desktop, mobile, web and hardware wallets.
Blockchain: Essentially a distributed database. Information within a blockchain is publicly 
shared across all participating users or machines. The bitcoin blockchain is a public record 
of all bitcoin transactions, which helps to verify transactions and prevent double spending.
Cryptocurrency: Virtual currency that employs cryptography for security purposes.
Cryptomarket: Anonymous digital platform that uses anonymising software (e.g. Tor) and 
cryptocurrencies (e.g. bitcoin) to facilitate the peer-to-peer trade of goods (including illicit 
drugs and new psychoactive substances) and services.
Customer feedback: When making a purchase, it is mandatory (or strongly encouraged, 
depending on the darknet market’s policy) for customers to leave feedback. The feedback is 
posted underneath a listing and can be used as a proxy to estimate transactions.
Dark web or darknet: A network, built on top of the internet, that is purposefully hidden; 
it has been designed specifically for anonymity. Unlike the deep web, the darknet is 
accessible only with special tools and software — browsers and other protocol beyond 
direct links or credentials.
Darknet market: Also known as a ‘cryptomarket’ (see definition above).
Deep web: A part of the internet not accessible to conventional search engines; the only 
way to access the deep web is by conducting a search within a particular website. For 
example, government databases and libraries contain huge amounts of deep-web data.
Doxing: The internet-based practice of researching and broadcasting personally identifiable 
information about an individual. This is a practice that drug sellers on the deep web can 
use to coerce or blackmail customers once they have obtained personal information (e.g. 
a postal address) to make the shipment. At this point in the transaction, buyers have no 
guarantee that sellers will delete their data once the deal has been finalised.
Encryption: The process of converting data to an unrecognisable or ‘encrypted’ form. It is 
commonly used to protect sensitive information, including files, storage devices and data 
transfers, so that only authorised parties can view it.
Escrow: A financial instrument held by a third party on behalf of the other two parties in 
a transaction. The funds are held by the escrow service until it receives the appropriate 
written or oral instructions, or until obligations have been fulfilled. Securities, funds and 
other assets can be held in escrow.
(1) https://bitcoincharts.com/markets/currencies/
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Exit scam: A scam in which a darknet market administrator or a vendor shuts down 
operations while stealing as much money as possible from users and/or buyers in the 
process.
Fiat currency: A currency that a government has declared to be legal tender, but which 
is not backed by a physical commodity. The value of fiat money is derived from the 
relationship between supply and demand, rather than from the value of the material that 
the money is made of.
Finalise early: A circumvent escrow that ensures direct payment without funds first being 
held in escrow as a backup measure in terms of high levels of concern over exit scams or 
law enforcement seizure, reducing the risk that vendors and buyers lose the funds held in 
escrow.
Freenet: A peer-to-peer platform, using a decentralised distributed data store, to keep 
and deliver information. The distributed data store of Freenet is used by many third-party 
programmes and plug-ins to provide microblogging and media sharing, anonymous and 
decentralised tracking, blogging, etc.
Garlic routing: A variant of onion routing that encrypts multiple messages together to make 
it more difficult for attackers to perform traffic analysis. Garlic routing is one of the key 
factors that distinguishes I2P from Tor and other privacy or encryption networks.
Grams: A service that offers a way to search for products across different darknet markets.
Hidden services: A feature provided by the Tor browser that enables a user to anonymously 
host and browse content and services within a vast address space.
Internet (discussion) forum: A web-based environment where ideas and topics can be 
discussed freely among users. Forum members generally log in with a screen name or alias 
to post and comment on content. Forums differ from real-time internet messaging and chat 
rooms in that the topics and information are not intended to be discussed in real time, but 
instead are posted for all users to see over an extended period.
The Invisible Internet Project (I2P): An alternative to Tor hidden services. It is an overlay 
network based on passing messages between routers using garlic routing with a distributed 
hash table for a global directory of available routers.
Mining: A process for generating new bitcoins by creating new blockchains.
Multisignature (‘multisig’) escrow: This payment method is the most secure, as multiple 
keys are generated for the bitcoin transaction and the payment release process. The 
multisignature allows 2-of-2 or 2-of-3 escrow services, where a 2-of-3 service provides the 
most security for three keys: the market’s key, the vendor’s key and the buyer’s key.
Onion routing: A technique for anonymous communication over a computer network. In 
an onion network, messages are encapsulated in layers of encryption. The encrypted data 
are transmitted through a series of network nodes called onion routers, each of which 
‘peels away’ a single layer, uncovering the data’s next destination. When the final layer is 
decrypted, the message arrives at its destination. The sender remains anonymous because 
each intermediary knows the location of only the immediately preceding and following 
nodes.
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OpenBazaar: An open-source project to create a decentralised network for peer-to-peer 
commerce online. Each computer handles only a part of the marketplace, rather than 
everything being handled by one single computer or server. Use of Tor hidden services or 
I2P sites could be possible with this model, to further protect the identity and privacy of 
users involved in the marketplace.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP): A data encryption and decryption computer program that 
provides cryptographic privacy and authentication for data communication. PGP is often 
used for signing, encrypting and decrypting texts, emails, files, directories and whole-disk 
partitions, and to increase the security of email communications.
Protocol: The scheme in which internet content is retrieved and displayed to a browser. Tor 
and the darknet use a ‘non-standard communication protocol’, which refers to the complex 
set of onion proxy methods used to obscure the identity of the requestor and the content 
server. ‘Protocol’ can also refer to the currency used for the financial transaction, e.g. 
bitcoin.
Relay (or node): A device that switches internet traffic from one computer to another before 
it reaches its destination. The Tor network comprises around 7 000 relays.
Router: The hardware used to forward packets of information along a network, performing 
the traffic-directing functions of the internet.
Scrape (as a verb): In the context of web-content scraping, this term describes the process 
of harvesting large sets of data from websites and storing the content in a database on a 
local computer or server. 
Scrape (as a noun): A copy of the entire content of a darknet market for further analysis.
Surface web (or clear web): The ‘regular’ internet, which can be found by the link-crawling 
techniques used by typical search engines such as Google, Bing and Yahoo. It is the 
unencrypted non-dark, non-Tor internet. In this report, the term ‘surface web’ is used.
Tor (The Onion Router): A free web browser designed for anonymous internet browsing and 
hosting; the most commonly used tool for accessing and browsing the darknet.
Tumbling: A method of mixing/scrambling or anonymising the source of bitcoin.
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Annex 1
Local darknet drug markets survey
The EMCDDA and Europol are preparing a joint analysis on drugs and darknet markets to be published in 
the last quarter of 2017. Part of the analysis will focus on a subcategory of darknet marketplaces — those 
with limited geographical scope of operation, catering for national (and/or local) markets. To help us gauge 
the extent and key features of these markets, you are invited to complete this short survey.
The questions below consider local (national) darknet websites selling drugs over Tor (The Onion 
Router), I2P (the Invisible Internet Project), OpenBazaar or a similar hidden service network, using 
cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, litecoin or dogecoin, hosting multiple sellers other than the site 
operators, and operating in national/local languages and within a fixed national (or smaller) geographical 
scope. For instance, the Tor-based Valhalla was founded in October 2013 as a Finnish-only marketplace for 
drugs and other illicit products. While global darknet markets that tend to operate in the English language 
are increasingly targeted by research, monitoring and international law enforcement activities, non-English-
language markets, such as Valhalla, tend to be excluded from these activities and subsequent analyses, as 
they are more difficult to navigate. Data and information on these marketplaces are nevertheless important 
and need to be reflected in any up-to-date analyses of the online drug trade.
In collaboration with a relevant national partner involved in online investigations in relation to illicit drugs, 
please read carefully each question and provide your answers. Questions 1-3 relate to the numbers and 
key features of national/local darknet marketplaces. Questions 4-6 aim to elicit information about law 
enforcement strategies and data and information on recently completed or ongoing operations, and will be 
suitably anonymised.
Data protection note: As a matter of routine practice, the EMCDDA does not collect datasets that contain 
personal information, i.e. data that directly identify individuals or organisations or that can be used in 
combination to identify individuals or organisations. Such information is securely kept and not shared in 
public print or electronic publications.
Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions. If possible, please answer all questions.
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